The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine, according to the review of the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) for January 11.

“The apparent Russian ability to generate forces at a rate equal to Russian losses likely provides Russian forces the ability to replenish units that the Russian command has withdrawn from the line due to degradation and later return these replenished units to the front. Russian forces maintain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine, and the absence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations likely removes pressure on operational deployments that had previously partially restrained the Russians‘ ability to conduct rotations,” the report reads.

It is noted that Russian forces have not seized the battlefield initiative in Kherson region, however, and appear to be degrading units and formations operating near the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River without making apparent efforts to conduct operational level rotations (although they do appear to conduct tactical-level rotations).

ISW reports that it has not observed complaints in the ranks of the occupiers about the lack of rotation since the summer of 2023.

Analysts note that Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

At the same time, the ISW points out that the Russian force formation apparatus is making up for losses in Ukraine due to poorly trained and relatively ineffective personnel in combat, which the Russian command considers sufficient for conventional exhausting frontal attacks. “These assaults have yet to result in more than marginal Russian gains in Ukraine since early October 2023, and it is unlikely that Russian forces can continue them indefinitely in a way that will allow the Russians to convert tactical successes into operationally significant results … Russian combat capabilities in Ukraine may still degrade over time, therefore, despite the rotations, hindering the Russian military’s ability to sustain several significant offensive operations at once,” the report reads.

It is also emphasized that the occupiers may also suffer losses exceeding the capabilities of the Russian Federation to generate new forces if the Russian command decides to intensify offensive actions in Ukraine. “It is unclear if the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign, which relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants, would be able to provide the increased number of personnel required to conduct rotations during an intensified Russian offensive effort,” the ISW noted.