Exclusive interview of the NATO's Senior Representative to Ukraine, Patrick Turner, to Interfax-Ukraine News Agency

Text: Valerie Proshchenko

 

Tell us about your responsibilities as the new head of the NATO Representation in Ukraine. I understand that you have only been there for 3 months,  but what do you expect to accomplish in the coming months and what are the main tasks?

Yes, I've been here for three months. I was appointed in the summer by the former NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg. Before that, I had a long background in NATO. I worked for three Secretaries-General in the 1990s, then as the Deputy British Ambassador to NATO. Also, I was later part of NATO’s  International Staff as Assistant Secretary General heading first the Operations Division and then the Defence Policy and Planning Division. I was doing that latter job at the time of the full-scale invasion in 2022, and I did that job for some months afterward. So firstly, I can say that I know something about NATO, and secondly, I am passionate about Ukraine. I want Ukraine to prevail and be truly secure.

This is the first time that the NATO office in Ukraine has had a head at the level of an Assistant Secretary General. That's a sign of how seriously NATO takes the relationship with Ukraine and how important NATO thinks Ukraine is now and into the future. This is also clear from the decision made by the new Secretary General, Mark Rutte, in early October, to make his first official trip  to Ukraine.

You know that NATO has had some form of presence here for 26 years. It's taken different forms of a Liaison Office and an Information and Documentation Centre,  but now we're a NATO Representation. During this year, the NATO presence here has trebled in size, and we're planning to increase it further next year.

That goes along with some of the major decisions of NATO’s Washington Summit this summer, but it also reflects the decisions taken before the Summit. The presence is designed to represent NATO headquarters in its totality, and to be the link between NATO Headquarters and Ukraine. The goal is to represent the whole of the very substantial agenda between NATO and Ukraine agenda, so we need a sizeable presence.

 

You mentioned that next year your team will become bigger. How many people, if it's not secret, are going to be working here?

Now we have about 50 people, and we'll be adding around 20 next year. There is a lot of work to do, so we need to keep on building our presence. It is a mixture of Ukrainian and international colleagues.

 

I have to admit that not all people in our country understand the role of the changes in NATO Representation and the importance of your appointment, given that Ukraine is probably not joining NATO anytime soon. What is the necessity?

Members of NATO don't have NATO offices. There's a NATO office before a country becomes a member, but when you become a member then there isn't a NATO office, because you're fully integrated into NATO.

The agenda that we had even before the Washington Summit was significant. The NATO representation is not delivering on all of that agenda. There are many different parts of NATO and the Ukrainian system that are delivering on the agenda, but we're meant to be the overall eyes and ears for the NATO Headquarters here and to help deliver the agenda, and also help our Ukrainian colleagues.

I would like to stress that NATO Allies have said they're going to deliver at least 40 billion euros of military assistance during this year, and it looks likely that that will be achieved. That on its own is quite a large agenda.

 

The new command in Wiesbaden, the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine is probably the most important topic. It is expected to become fully operational by the end of this year. How is the process going and are there any changes to the plan?

NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), headquartered in Wiesbaden (Germany)  is now up and running, and beginning to assume responsibilities from the mechanisms established to provide support to Ukraine soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.

This is the outcome of an impressive, collective undertaking, namely NATO’s rapid stand-up of infrastructure, capabilities and communication systems at multiple locations across Europe, along with the sourcing of hundreds of personnel from across Allied and partner countries.

NSATU is now taking on responsibilities from the International Donor Coordination Centre (IDCC) and the U.S.-led Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U). It

will coordinate the provision, transfer and repair of military equipment critical to Ukraine’s operations, as well as training of Ukraine Armed Forces personnel in Allied countries to bolster their effectiveness. These activities will be synchronized with efforts to further develop Ukraine’s future military force, so that they can operate seamlessly together with Allied forces and use NATO standards.

 

Please explain the main purpose of the creation NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) and when and how it’s going to operate.

JATEC is a joint NATO-Ukraine institution and is the first of its kind. 

It's also joint civil-military and it's all about working together on lessons that are being learned from the war on your soil.

So, it's learning lessons together and really making the maximum use of those lessons to make both Ukraine and NATO more effective in building what we call defence and deterrence both in NATO and in Ukraine. And to build interoperability between NATO and Ukraine. There will be a strong Ukrainian presence.

I was there, in Bydgoszcz, last month and I think there is good progress towards establishing JATEC. There are excellent Ukrainian colleagues, and more Ukrainians will be coming in the next few weeks to join the team. It's a strong team and it's already doing work now and there will be an ambitious programme of work for next year.

 

So it's not fully operated yet?

We expect the Centre to begin working on the tasks assigned in the next few weeks, but I recommend that you speak with our military colleagues, for further details.

 

What are the results of the Allied Foreign Affairs Ministers at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 3-4 December 2024?. There were a lot of speculations and discussions in the media before this specific meeting.

Firstly, it was a good meeting. Secondly, this is a super important time for Ukraine given the  tough position on the battlefield and another tough winter ahead. The first message of Secretary General Mark Rutte was that NATO must provide maximum support to Ukraine. There have been a lot of individual announcements by Allies, not only the US but many European allies have been  making announcements of specific contributions of support. So the key message was the need for maximum support to Ukraine to sustain its position on the battlefield.

Going forward, we want Ukraine to be in the best possible position when the time comes to talk about a settlement and peace. But we need a just peace when that moment comes. And we want Ukraine to be in the strongest possible position. This attitude will be sustained, we're not going to move away from that.

Message number two from the meeting is that it is important that NATO and Ukraine  work together as closely as possible.  Ukraine is fighting hard, so we need to equip, train, and provide everything necessary to Ukrainian soldiers, and Ukraine needs to continue providing enough soldiers on the front line. It's a partnership between the two parties.

 

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Andrii Sybiha during his last visit to NATO Headquarters called on allies to urgently deliver at least 20 additional air defence systems type HAWK, NASAMS, and IRIS-T to strengthen Ukraine's energy resilience in the winter. Will NATO allies be able to meet our needs?

A key message of the Secretary General during the Ministerial was that we should take that request very seriously. Minister Sybiha made a rather specific request, and the Secretary General asked ministers to assist in delivering that request. I think there will be work by individual Allies to help deliver that request.

It was already agreed at the time of the Washington Summit that there would be additional air defence systems provided. That assistance has been delivered. And now this is additional assistance specifically to protect parts of the energy infrastructure. We know protecting the energy infrastructure, and keeping power flowing in Ukraine, is critical during the winter but also beyond. A lot of Allies want to help with that.

In general, Allies are very supportive of Ukraine going forward, wanting to provide maximum support to Ukraine. We know that we need to keep on supporting Ukraine, and that's our job.

 

And do you think it's possible to deliver some additional air defence until the end of this year, as Ukraine requested because it's already December?

I can't say the details of what systems will be provided and when. But we know that it's an urgent requirement and an urgent request. I can assure you that a good amount of time at the meeting in Brussels was taken talking about that request, and that urgent work on it is underway. And this was also a focus of a meeting the Secretary General just hosted in Brussels – with President Zelenskyy and a number of Allied leaders – on Wednesday (18 December).

Our minister Rustem Umerov has recently suggested that the next meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of defence ministers should be held in Kyiv. Can this really happen in Ukraine?

This is actually a longstanding request by Ukrainian colleagues that there be some kind of meeting of the NATO-Ukrainian Council, either at the level of ministers or maybe at the level of ambassadors, in Ukraine.

I'm not going to talk about what might happen next year.  I cannot forecast on behalf of ministers. It's up to the Secretary General and ministers to decide amongst themselves if they will have a meeting in Kyiv. The Secretary General and ministers will think about that. But the location of meetings is not the most important thing. The substance of meetings is the most important thing, and we will continue to concentrate on that.

 

The most discussed topic right now, however, is Syria. Don't you think that NATO's attention will shift there instead of Ukraine?

I will give a very short answer: no. It is always the case that there is more than one thing happening in the world at once. Leaders always have to be thinking about more than one thing at once. This is not any different.

We have no intention of shifting focus, attention, or effort away from Ukraine.

 

Ukrainians were very upset by NATO's reaction to Russia's involvement of North Korean troops in the war against Ukraine. Will there be any further actions by the Alliance or is some additional evidence needed?

The Secretary General has made very clear that the deployment of North Korean troops to the Kursk region is deeply worrying and represents a significant escalation in North Korea’s ongoing involvement in Russia's illegal war. It is also a sign of President Putin’s growing desperation. Furthermore, it represents another breach of UN Security Council resolutions and a dangerous expansion of Russia's war.

The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a threat to both Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security. We are working closely with our Indo-Pacific Partners to do everything we can, not only to keep the Euro-Atlantic safe, but also the Indo-Pacific.

Overall, this new development is part of a picture of Russia working with China, North Korea, and Iran in its assault on Ukraine. All of those countries are enabling the attack on Ukraine. The relationships have got closer. Russia is having to pay some heavy prices to those countries. Putin is having to pay in terms of providing missile technology to North Korea. That's a big concern. And he is paying a heavy price to China, which is an absolutely key enabler of Russia’s war.

None of this is acceptable, but all of this makes this clear that the war being prosecuted against Ukraine by Russia, which has absolutely no justification, is not just a war in Ukraine or a war in Europe, but it's a war with global implications. It illustrates that security is global. Security in Europe, and North America is fundamentally connected to the Indo-Pacific. I don't think people are thinking lightly about North Korean troops being used against Ukraine.

 

Is NATO afraid of the risk that their weapons or technology will end up in the DPRK?

The Allies who have been providing massive assistance to Ukraine certainly think about those risks when they provide the support. And those risks have not prevented assistance from happening. War always involves risks, and the risks always have to be assessed carefully.

Let me add that Allies are deeply concerned by the weapons and technology that Russia is transferring to the DPRK.

 

Let's talk about the Armed Forces of Ukraine and reforms even during the full-scale war. How close is our army to NATO, and what are you doing now to help our soldiers to be closer to your standards?

I would say on the overall reform picture, not just about the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, Ukraine has made lots of progress over the last 10 years. There is a very good record of progress. Ukraine has adapted in a huge number of ways.

If you zoom into the Armed Forces, I think all NATO Allies recognize that a lot of progress has been made. The report that was just agreed upon by Foreign Ministers on progress on the adapted Annual National Programme for Ukraine, recognizes that continued progress has been made on the reform agenda.

On the Armed Forces, the most obvious thing to say is we're hugely impressed, and every country would say absolutely that we salute the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the Ukrainian people for what you have been doing for over 10 years. I want to stress the whole 10 years, but also especially since 2022. Our admiration is part of what's led to huge military support, equipment, and training support to Ukraine. You have a million soldiers, 100 plus brigades. This is a massive capability, and we're very impressed with the capability and what you've been able to do with it. And we certainly want to make sure that assistance is delivered in the most helpful way that it can be.

If you compare what is in the Ukrainian Army with what is in other NATO countries, in many ways, it compares very well. But the scale is unparalleled, as well the skills and experiences you have had on the battlefield are unparalleled; these are experiences that NATO armed forces have not had in recent years. You have battlefield experience, you're doing battlefield innovation. And that is part of the reason that you've been able to hold the line, as well as part of the reason that 700,000 plus Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in the last 1,000 days. That's a huge number.

I would also say that everybody knows that in the middle of a war, it is not necessarily possible to conduct every technical reform that you might want to conduct in terms of, for example, the management of the Ministry of Defence, or some of the systems in the Ministry of Defence. But we do not look at Ukraine as somehow undeveloped or unworthy, absolutely not.

 

Many Ukrainian warriors are so experienced, that they usually say that they can teach NATO more than NATO can teach them.

Yes. I think there's a lot of truth in that. And for example, JATEC is meant to be learning lessons together. NATO is super interested in the lessons that you have learned.

That said, there are things that NATO can offer as well. But yes, you have enormous amounts to teach NATO countries, and NATO countries know there is a great deal  to learn.

 

 We remember the NATO representation to Ukraine statement that two Ukrainian defense procurement agencies should continue to operate separately at least during wartime. How do you assess our reform in procurement and what else needs to be done?

Overall, I would say NATO and Ukraine did a thorough fundamental review of the procurement system now, and going into the future made some recommendations for wartime, for peacetime. I think that review is public knowledge.

Our message is: 1) we want to keep working with Ukrainian colleagues on maximizing the effectiveness of the procurement system; 2) we want to make sure that what we agreed together and the recommendations of that review that were agreed at the Washington Summit are implemented.

We will not suddenly go down a different track. We will continue to be attached to the outcome of the review being implemented. We'll continue to work closely with Ukrainian colleagues on that.

 

 Is it necessary to merge the Defence Procurement Agency and the State Logistics Operator into a single entity after the war? It’s been said that NATO’s standards request it.

The review said that after the war, the two agencies could be combined, but it didn't assume they had to be combined. I wouldn't say that it's a requirement of the review. But the review certainly foresaw the potential that they could be combined.

 

How do you assess the Agencies’ supervisory board appointment? There are probably the most important one is in the Defense Procurement Agency.

We're pleased that the supervisory boards were appointed. We pressed hard.  That was one of the outcomes of the review, and we wanted to see that outcome implemented. The appointments were made to the supervisory boards, and now we want to make sure that they operate as effectively as possible. We want to see the boards operating, being effective, performing their functions. Implementation is not just some names that have been found, but the boards operating and performing their functions. So we all need to see that that is happening.

 

Ukraine wants neighboring states to help shoot down Russian missiles and drones over Ukrainian territory. Is this question on the table?

The defence of the territory of NATO Allies, whether it's Poland or Romania or any other country is a matter for that country and a matter for NATO. NATO countries collectively have the capabilities to defend their airspace.

The request which was made several months ago, I haven't heard it repeated lately. But if we are talking about the request to NATO Allies or NATO to start essentially defending the airspace above Ukraine, our assessment and our legal advice is that that would mean that NATO would become a party to the war.

NATO said from the beginning: we do not want to be a party to the war. I'm sure that is frustrating, but that's NATO's position. At the same time, I want to reassure our Ukrainian counterparts, that NATO Allies continue to do all they can to boost your country’s air defence capabilities.

 

Ukraine is in talks with NATO allies about protecting Polish airspace, which would allow Warsaw to transfer its fleet of MiG-29 aircraft to Kyiv.

I would say that the less issues like that are discussed publicly, the better the chances of having a good outcome. In my opinion, megaphone diplomacy is rarely useful. I know that the most senior NATO colleagues, both political and military, have been working very hard to make sure that we get to a position where Poland feels able to make the MIGs  available, but I don't particularly want to get into more detail. As I just said, the less we discuss these issues in public, the better the chances of their being resolved in private. But the latest that I heard on that was encouraging.

 

After Joe Biden’s permission for Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles on the territory of Russia, the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that now we need to get more long-range capabilities. Is NATO working on this question?

At the last Foreign Minister's meeting, the Secretary General said that it's very important to make sure we provide as much air defence capability as possible for Ukraine. Both what we promised in Washington, but also in response to the Ukrainian request for additional systems to protect the energy infrastructure. But this also applies to offensive capabilities to put Ukraine in the best position on the battlefield in 2025 and beyond. So, that includes maximum military assistance in terms of offensive capabilities.

As you know, we've certainly encouraged Allies not to place restrictions on their support to Ukraine – including in this context. We would like Ukraine to have further systems, and Ukraine has been making good use of systems provided by several allies. So the more that Allies can provide those systems – without limitatations – the better, because the aim is to get Ukraine into a position where continuing the war makes no sense for the aggressor.

 

Do you consider Putin's nuclear threats serious? Especially in the context of the Russian dictator's renewed remarks about the so-called Oreshnik.

We are always assessing whether there is a serious nuclear threat, 24/7, every day of the year. We take it very seriously. Likewise, we have not seen a serious actual change in Russia's nuclear posture. It's been said on at least two occasions recently that Russia revised its nuclear doctrine, but we don't see a rise in the actual threat.

But NATO, ‘round the clock, pays attention to having effective deterrence and defence capabilities and that includes nuclear deterrence capabilities, so we continue to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. Three NATO allies have their own nuclear deterrents. We do exercise the NATO capability. But we do not think that at the moment there is a real increase in the threat of nuclear use by Russia. And we don't think it's useful to spend our time talking about Russian nuclear threats because of the saber-rattling by Putin.

On the Oreshnik, firstly, using a system like that is escalation. But it's also designed either to deter NATO Allies from assisting Ukraine or to demoralize the Ukrainian population. I see no sign actually of it being successful in either respect, either deterring NATO Allies who are supporting Ukraine nor the Ukrainian population.

As with Russia's other attacks, which have no justification, it's completely unacceptable. We had a NATO-Ukraine Council meeting and made clear: 1) we condemn the attack; 2) we have no intention of being distracted, diverted or deterred by the use of a system like that. And we know that Putin has threatened a further use of the system. In my view, that would be no more useful to Putin than the first attack.

 

What about Ukraine's request to get the invitation to NATO now? Do you think it is possible in the near future? And there is the most common question: when will Ukraine join to join NATO?

As NATO leaders said at the Washington Summit, Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO membership. That's a very clear statement. All Allies supported that statement. And this point has been reaffirmed at the Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers earlier this month. They set out a large range of decisions which are designed to help Ukraine get across what was described as the bridge to NATO membership. Amongst those were €40 billion annually in military aid for Ukraine that will be reviewed each year.

Secondly, we said that we'd set up the NATO mission to deliver equipment and training, which we have done.

Thirdly, we decided to launch JATEC. Fourthly, there are bilateral security agreements, which most Allies have now signed with Ukraine. And then all the work that we're doing in different fields such as the Annual National Programme, the Interoperability Roadmap and the Comprehensive Assistance Package. So, all of that is still the approach of NATO.

But right now, as the Secretary General said, Ukraine's in a tough fight. Now, we need to help Ukraine to the maximum extent on the battlefield. We need to help the country with air defences, with offensive capabilities. That is the intent now and that will remain the intent going into 2025.

It is very apparent that there is a linkage between the situation on the battlefield, and the ending of the war, and what will happen on NATO membership. NATO does not take in countries that are at war, so we want to see a durable, just and fair peace for Ukraine and lasting security for Ukraine, for Europe, for America, for the whole world. But now is not the moment to speculate on how, when, where, with whom this or that discussion will take place on peace, and therefore this or that discussion will take place on NATO membership.

But also, the Secretary General stated in Kyiv that Russia has no vote and no veto on Ukraine’s membership in NATO. NATO membership is something to be discussed between the members of the Alliance and a country aspiring to join NATO. Mark Rutte signaled very clearly at the Foreign Ministerial earlier this month  - and our position on that is not going to change in the coming weeks - that now is not a useful time to start sketching out theoretical scenarios, plans, timetables, procedures, and steps for Ukraine, but that it’s time for us to maximise our support.

 

So at the next NATO summit in The Hague, we should probably expect promises of support, but not an invitation to join the Alliance?

I'm not going to second guess what leaders will discuss. I can tell you two things I know that they will be discussing, and these are linked to this question. Evidently, there will be a discussion on Ukraine at the Summit, but I'm not going to forecast exactly the contents of that discussion. The Secretary General has been pursuing two big themes publicly, apart from the need for the strongest possible support for Ukraine now.

One is that Europe will have to spend much much more on defence. It really means much more. Secondly, Allies need to boost their defence production capacities by very large margins. At the moment, as you know, the production capacity in NATO countries is seriously inadequate. Those two things are needed to maintain effective defence and deterrence in NATO, but they're also needed to ensure that we can continue to support Ukraine into the future.

Our absolute intent is to continue to support Ukraine into the future. We want to help Ukraine to end the Russian war. But we certainly don't want to see what Russia has done in Ukraine happening on NATO territory. And if we don't bring an end to the war in a way that provides lasting, really assured security for Ukraine, then this is a problem that will recur somewhere else.