The first part of an exclusive interview of the second President of Ukraine (1994-2005) Leonid Kuchma with the Interfax-Ukraine agency

 

How do you assess the realistic prospects and conditions for ending the war? What changes in foreign and domestic policy should be made, in your opinion, to improve the situation before then?

It is difficult to make a realistic assessment of the prospects for war today. We can make predictions and build theories, but until the US elections and the first real steps of the new administration, there are many unknowns in all calculations. Today we can give guesses rather than answers, and this is irresponsible.

I don't want to give our government any recommendations or advice. People are working, and they probably have their own strategy. There are action plans that we do not know about. So I'll say what I think is most important.

In domestic politics, it is internal unity. At the beginning of the Great War, we had it. The army, society, and the government were, so to speak, a monolith. Even within the political elite, there was no infighting for a while. Today it is no longer the case. First, our elite resumed the rat race of their petty interests. Then the contradictions between the government, the army, and society began to emerge. Not conflicts, God forbid, but real contradictions. From the front, we hear reproaches against the military and political leadership on various occasions - organizational, operational, tactical, and informational. Dissatisfaction with the army's demands to intensify mobilization is growing in society. The authorities accuse society of being insufficiently prepared to defend the state. There are calls from society for the government to set an example and start with itself. There are many such contradictions. Yes, the main thing has not changed: we are still united by hatred of the enemy. But we have less understanding among ourselves. Unlike the panic-mongers and provocateurs, I am not saying that this brings defeat closer. But it definitely postpones victory.

In foreign policy, it would be useful to see the return of a clear sequence of steps. At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, at least, after Bucha and the termination of peace talks in Istanbul, our signal to the world was unequivocal: we will fight to the end, help us. But last year, a kind of pluralism appeared in our global communication. I understand why. Some of our arguments have been addressed to  the collective West, while others to the so-called Global South. Some our theses are addressed to defenders of fundamental Western values, others – to supporters of "business as usual" with Russia. Some are addressed to determined "hawks," others - to cautious "peacemakers". Yes, we have to convey "his" argument to each addressee. But the problem is that they are heard simultaneously. And if you wish, you can see inconsistency in them - and many of our partners have such a wish. Moreover, I do not believe that they are so naive that they do not understand why Ukraine conducts such multifaceted communication. They understand everything perfectly, but this "many-voice" position gives some the opportunity to pretend to be naive. How so, they ask? If Ukraine is holding summits calling for peace, how can we talk about supplying it with weapons?

To what extent, in your opinion, was Russia’s response – war – to the independent path of Ukraine inevitable? How could this have been avoided? In terms of the current state of affairs, how do you view the work of the Trilateral Contact Group? Were Russia's intentions then correctly assessed?

Of course, war was not the only scenario for Putin. It is clear that he would prefer easier ways to bring us under his power. Probably, the first bet was on the "fifth column," on provoking an internal split in Ukraine. But that didn't work. I think that the attack on [former Member of Parliament Viktor] Medvedchuk's structures in February 2021 was a decisive step by our leaders, after which Putin realized that he would not be able to take us bare-handed.

How could the war have been avoided? Ukraine could have sought to prevent it in two diametrically opposed ways: either by strengthening our defense capabilities to a level that would deter Russia from attacking, or by surrendering without a fight. Unfortunately, for many years our leaders did not accomplish the former. Fortunately, in 2022 they didn't do the latter.

But let's be honest: the war could have truly been prevented by the actions of not so much Ukraine, as the leaders of the Western countries. If, at the first obvious signs of preparations for Russian aggression, they would not have tried to appease the Kremlin, but had clearly outlined the prospects of punishment (not to mention the introduction of preventive sanctions), this could have stopped Putin.

As for the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), its work was far from "high matters" – all decisions were made by the leaders of the Normandy Four countries. The TCG was an instrument that allowed the suspension of the war, but could not in any way prevent its renewal. I am proud that among the results of the group's work was a ceasefire and the exchange of prisoners, but we had to deal with other problems, as well, including humanitarian issues, improving the lives of the civilian population in the conflict zone. So, it was difficult to calculate the Kremlin's intentions here. The general mood – perhaps, but it was already obvious.

What do you think about the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine in 2025? What, in your opinion, political and party changes await us ? How serious are the risks of a political crisis in Ukraine during and after the war? Do you see the threat of social division and confrontation, the possibility of another Maidan?

My answer is simple. Elections in 2025 are absolutely necessary if the war is to end. And elections are absolutely impossible if the war does not end. And in this case, they are impossible neither technically nor, what is much more important, morally. In wartime elections, it is impossible to ensure their fairness and truly popular expression of will. You will not deliver a ballot box to every trench. And without the voices of those sitting in that trench, this will not be an election, but blasphemy.

Whenever elections are held, it is absolutely impossible to predict their outcome today. Postwar elections are generally unpredictable. The fatigue and trauma of society make predicting election results a thankless task. Let me remind you that in 1945, Churchill, the savior of Britain at the beginning of the war and then the triumphant and defeated Hitler, lost the parliamentary elections without a chance. History has many examples of the opposite.

I can predict one thing: the second electoral revolution in a row awaits us. The first took place in 2019, when Zelenskyy’s team simply swept most political figures off the board. But at the time of those presidential elections, he had neither his own political party, nor a political or professional team. Therefore, a large number of new deputies were not systemic politicians – they were not politicians at all. Post-war elections promise many surprises. If Zelenskyy’s chances of reelection as president can be optimistically assessed, it is unlikely most parliamentary deputies will be able to defend their mandates.

Post-war Ukraine will be like it has never been before, with unprecedented national self-awareness and unprecedented destruction of entire regions and industries, with unprecedented pride and unprecedented pain, with an unprecedented demand for social justice. It will definitely be a country of heroes, but also a country of widows and orphans, disabled people and refugees. Therefore, its political landscape will be different. New electoral niches are already forming, contours of new political forces are emerging. I am very curious, what will be the political project of war veterans? What will the volunteer movement grow into? What will be the role and participation of migrants and refugees? Where will the remnants of the pro-Russia electorate go and how will they behave? Will a national, state-oriented leftist force appear for the first time in Ukraine’s recent history? What issues will populists target first?

As for the split in society and the new Maidans, I think these are two different issues. For me, the Maidan is first and foremost a conflict between society and the government. It is obvious, it is happening in the heart of the country, near its main institutions, which further emphasizes its obviousness. It is highly localized, which ultimately helps to resolve it quickly. And splits within society occur in different places and at different levels. At first, these are not rifts, but cracks, which are much harder to notice. But it is extremely important and necessary to notice them in advance. It's like marble. The block may look monolithic, but you can see the lines of future splits. This is the task of the authorities: to see future splits in the form of cracks. And I'm sure that preventing social contradictions is even more important for the government than society’s protest to itself.

I will give an example. I admit that at one time the Maidan was a surprise for me. Paying most attention to the economy, I underestimated social trends. I thought that if the country had a good economic situation and everything was in order with political freedoms (which was the case), then people had no reason to be dissatisfied. I will repeat, I underestimated the level of demand of a mature, reflective society that had developed in Ukraine during the years of my presidency. For me, the most disturbing moment of the Orange Revolution (much more disturbing than the most ardent speeches on the Maidan) was the situation of one day in November 2004. It was when the Party of Regions brought their supporters (mainly from Donbas) to rallies in Kyiv to mirror the protests, “anti-Maidan” protests.

Usually they did not move beyond the railway station and, having protested, returned home. But once Yanukovych, speaking at another rally, called on his supporters to go unblock state institutions and deal with the "oranges" who were standing there. And the crowd of "guests of the capital," warmed up not only by Yanukovych's fiery speeches, moved towards the Maidan. When I learned about it, I instantly and forever realized the difference between Maidan and civil resistance. From the very beginning of the revolution, I was sure that there would be no significant clashes between the Maidan activists and security forces. I gave a clear order that force could not be used against the demonstrators. But I could not guarantee anything in the event that protesters from Donbas reached the Maidan. This is the difference: the government can regulate the Maidans, restraining itself (unfortunately, not always, as 2014 showed), because it is the protagonist of this conflict. It is much more difficult to deal with conflicts within society after they have already flared up.

That day, I used all the levers I had to stop the aggressive crowd and return them to the station as quickly as possible. I have learned that lesson forever. I hope that the war has made Ukrainian society even more mature and responsible. It has realized the vital need for its own strong state, no matter what bills it has to pay. Our people have not been going to the front and to the terrorist defense since the first hours of the Russian invasion, and they are not giving almost everything they have to raise money for the army today to jeopardize what they are defending with their own hands tomorrow. After all, even if we assume that the consequences of the Maidan will be entirely positive, the state is inevitably weakened at the moment it happens. Russia has already taken advantage of this in 2014 and will certainly do everything it can to strike us as hard as possible if it happens again. So, I hope that both the government and society will have the wisdom and survival instinct to prevent new Maidans.

But within the society itself, I don't know how the split will be, but there will definitely be cracks. The cracks are already running on the stone. Someone fought in the war, and someone did everything to avoid it. Someone stayed in Ukraine all the time, and someone left immediately. Someone sacrificed their lives and health, and someone paid off. Some supported the Ukrainian Armed Forces with their meager earnings, while others grew rich by weakening the Armed Forces. I am not talking about the questions (not legal, but purely emotional) that will arise for many after the de-occupation of the temporarily occupied territories. These future splits can already be seen today, and today we must prepare to prevent them tomorrow.

Which political force or individual political figures would you support in Ukraine? Does such a power exist now? Did it ever exist?

I rarely support anyone directly. I remember only two cases. In 1991, in the first presidential elections, I supported my older friend and political mentor Ihor Yukhnovsky. In 2019, I supported Volodymyr Zelenskyy. By the way, contrary to legend, I did not directly support Yanukovych. Even if he had wanted me to, he had no right. But he didn't want me to. And Yanukovych won the presidential election not under me, but under [former President Victor] Yushchenko.

As for the present, I have already mentioned Zelenskyy. And I will repeat what I have already said: I am very much looking forward to the emergence of new political forces. Especially two kinds. Veterans, as it will be the strength of those who signed the oath of loyalty to Ukraine with their own blood and will definitely not back down from it. And volunteers, since it will be the strength of those who have proven their extraordinary efficiency in working on their own, so it should be even greater if they get access to the levers of public office. I hope that such political forces will emerge. And maybe they will unite, because even today they are united by common goals and efforts.

What do you think about Yanukovych? What is his fate? Did you have any contact with Yanukovych or his team after he fled or after the full-scale invasion?

I could tell you that I don't think about Yanukovych at all. And if I did think about him, my thoughts would not be suitable for an interview appearing in a respectable new agency. This much would be true. It seems that for all these years I have not said a single word about Yanukovych in the media.

I think it's because it's unpleasant to talk about the disappointment of such a force and such a level. It's not that he was charming – No, he wasn’t. It’s just that Yanukovych really had the potential to serve the country, but instead he chose gluttony, and then bloodlust, betrayal and shame.

However, Yanukovych became a disappointment for me long before that. I knew what he was capable of since the Maidan days. Even then, I understood that in our difficult face-to-face conversation, he did not hear my words that no power is worth shedding the blood of peaceful fellow citizens for. What was an axiom for me was just the sound of words for him.

I don't really understand who you mean by Yanukovych's team. As for former Party of Regions functionaries who remained in Ukraine, of course, over the years I have contacted and met with many of them. If you are talking about Yanukovych's closest entourage, which ran away with him, then no, not at all, as is the case with Yanukovych himself. If I met him, I would say only those words that I would be ashamed to say in this interview.

The second part of the interview