18:48 02.10.2024

Author YEVHEN MAHDA

Eurointegration with a Pole Vault

4 min read
Eurointegration with a Pole Vault

Yevhen Mahda, Executive Director of the "Institute of World Policy"
 

The success of the Freedom Party in the Austrian parliamentary elections, a party that not only has neo-Nazi roots but also poorly concealed signs of "Putin-understanding," is the latest warning for official Kyiv. Maintaining merely rhetorical exercises and rosy illusions about the pace of Ukraine’s European integration in foreign policy towards neighbors threatens significant disappointment.

Of course, Austria does not share borders with Ukraine, and the Habsburg legacy is remembered by both countries only in cultural contexts. However, the success of right-wing politicians in the Alpine Republic indicates troubling trends for Ukraine in the Central European region.

Under the premiership of Volodymyr Groysman, the idea of transforming the Visegrad Four into a V4+1 format with Ukraine was publicly discussed, but now such dreams are far-fetched. Problems in relations with our closest neighbors didn’t arise overnight, but they won’t disappear tomorrow either.

The main issue is Russian aggression, which has brought enormous human losses and unprecedented sacrifices to Ukraine. With the start of the full-scale invasion, our neighbors not only opened their borders to Ukrainian refugees but also became their safe haven (Poland leads in this regard, followed by the Czech Republic, which doesn’t share a border with Ukraine). Even the Ukraine-skeptical Hungary actively welcomed our refugees.

By the way, relations with Poland, not the many antics of Viktor Orbán, are the true litmus test of the word "crisis." Yes, a major crisis is manifesting in our relations with our neighbors. Relations with Romania and Moldova are somewhat easier: by turning into an important transit corridor, Bucharest seems to have received moral and financial compensation for the fact that under Viktor Yanukovych’s rule, Romania was seen as a potential adversary. Moldova, in turn, decided to be "bound by a single goal" (European integration) with Ukraine.

However, relations with the Visegrad Group remain problematic. Poland continues to push the issue of exhuming the victims of the Volyn tragedy, though it hasn’t renounced its status as a strategic partner. Slovakia, through the words of its Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár, states that it will support Ukraine’s European integration, but not its NATO membership. Viktor Orbán, during Hungary's presidency of the European Council, aspires to become a peacemaker of the Old World, despite lacking the formal grounds or the support of more influential countries. The upcoming parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic may create a socio-political backdrop, after the potential victory of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš's ANO party, where current assessments of President Petr Pavel’s often harsh remarks about the prospects of ending the Russia-Ukraine war may sound like music to the ear. These elections, as well as Poland’s presidential campaign, will take place next year.

Against its will, Ukraine has sent millions of its citizens to Central Europe, yet it has failed to turn them into a resource of influence; instead, they appear to be a demographic refreshment for the host countries. The absence of a strategy to return our citizens from neighboring countries is clearly working against Ukraine. Abroad, not everyone is ready to resist the temptation to abandon their Ukrainian identity and citizenship. Significant negative factors also include the differences in economic models between Ukraine and its neighbors, as Ukrainian oligarchs have not only become a global menace but also repel potential Central European investors. Serious discussions about our neighbors’ involvement in Ukraine’s post-war recovery are premature.

The new Foreign Minister, Andriy Sybiha, has begun "checking the perimeter" by visiting several neighboring states and showing a willingness to engage in dialogue on complex issues. However, someone seems to have negotiated with the Hungarian energy company MOL, which has resumed the transit of Russian oil through Ukrainian territory, without Sybiha’s involvement. Whether Warsaw and Kyiv will manage to push the Volyn issue into the background is still unknown, but this will be a key aspect not only for bilateral relations but also for Kyiv’s strategic approach. It must be understood that the demand for honoring the victims of the Volyn tragedy in Polish society is powerful and, in essence, transcends party lines.

Ukraine will either have to change its attitude toward its neighbors, learn to study them thoroughly, and consider their interests while defending its own, or train for pole vaults. A negative dynamic in relations with countries that have their own experience of European integration is unlikely to contribute to Ukraine’s swift accession to the EU. A choice will have to be made quite soon.

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