Switzerland ready to become platform for negotiations on sustainable, just peace in Ukraine – Ambassador
An exclusive interview with Ambassador of Switzerland to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova Félix Baumann for the Interfax-Ukraine news agency
Peace talks
What is your forecast for when the war might end? And how long do you believe the subsequent peace could last?
It's difficult to make any predictions. The situation is changing so quickly. There will be a peace. The peace settlement will depend on the willingness of Russia to engage in meaningful negotiations. And a peace that is concluded quickly, but which does not comply with international law and the United Nations' Charter will most certainly be a fragile peace.
That's why Switzerland is actually committed to follow any possible path together with partner countries to achieve a comprehensive and just peace, because this will be the prerequisite for any peace settlement to be lasting.
What role can Switzerland play in a new peace negotiation on Ukrainian questions? And is it still ready to host a Ukrainian-Russian meeting? How does it view Putin's ICC warrants?
Last year, Switzerland organized the Peace Summit on Peace at Burgenstock. And after that Ssummit, we remained in contact with all the parties, including Russia, in line with our good offices. It's precisely this stance of neutrality, international Geneva, and our mediation expertise that led the United States and Ukraine to turn to Switzerland at the end of November two weeks ago.
The meeting that took place on November 23 in Geneva was held at the request of the United States and Ukraine to discuss the U.S.-proposed peace plan. Switzerland acted as a facilitator andin the host country. We did not participate in the bilateral talks. But we are ready to continue performing this role as long as the parties wish.
Should a peace conference in Switzerland become a concrete prospect at some point, our country will be ready to examine all questions related to the immunity of heads of state and government.
Let me also add that in three weeks, on January 1, there will be another platform through which Switzerland can contribute to these efforts. Switzerland will take over the Chairpersonship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on January 1 for the third time after 1996 and 2014.
We are very grateful for the trust that was given to us in holding this Chairpersonship. At the same time, we are fully aware that given the very difficult international context, many challenges lie ahead. But among our foremost priorities as a Chairperson, we want to support any credible path towards a just peace in Ukraine, based on international law and the Helsinki principles, and to ensure that the OSCE is prepared to contribute to this goal as soon as the circumstances allow. We will also strive to promote efficient and inclusive multilateral diplomacy that effectively ensures security in Europe. Diplomacy is very important to us.
What is Switzerland’s stance on the key issues of the peace process: consent to the loss of territory and the revision of its legal status, limitations on the armed forces, international security guarantees, the use of frozen Russian assets, and the issue of amnesty?
Well, any armed conflict that is not clearly decided on the battlefield by one of the belligerents in the end will be resolved through compromises. Switzerland’s position has not changed: Switzerland over and repeatedly and strongly condemned Russia’s war against Ukraine. We have consistently worked – and continue to work – for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in line with international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Helsinki principles. And we have been consistently advocating for the independence and the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Earlier representatives of your country mentioned the possibility of sending 200 peacekeepers to Ukraine. So, what is your current position on taking part in security guarantees?
You are referring to a statement made by our head of the armed forces earlier this year. The legal situation is quite clear: Switzerland can send military personnel for a peacekeeping operation abroad if there is a mandate from either the United Nations Security Council or the OSCE. In practice, this would mean that both Ukraine and Russia would have to accept such an operation. However, Switzerland cannot participate in any peace-enforcement mechanism that does not have a mandate of the United Nations Security Council or the OSCE.
In any case, it would ultimately be the Swiss government and parliament who would decide on sending a military contingent for a peacekeeping mission.
And then you also asked about security guarantees. Well, the Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly stated that this is actually quite a broad concept, which also includes support for reconstruction and recovery. And I think that with Switzerland'swith the Switzerland’s Ukraine Country Programmenational program for recovery and reconstruction, we are actually supporting Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction, as well as its economic resilience.
Recently, Ukraine expressed concern to you over performances by Russian cultural figures in Switzerland, specifically referencing Russian opera singer Anna Netrebko, who did perform in Zurich in early November. What is your view on this matter?
Well, I understand this is an emotional issue in Ukraine. However, in Switzerland, the cultural institutions are private entities. They do their programming on their own. That's also the case for the Opera of Zurich [Zurich Opera House], which is a private institution that operates the opera in Zurich.
The federal government has no possibility to decide in or influence the programming of these institutions. Moreover, artistic freedom is a value held in a very high regard in Switzerland. It is also enshrined in the Federal Constitution.
Swiss Support & Sanctions Policy
What is Switzerland's position on frozen Russian assets and sanctioned individuals? Under what conditions could Ukraine receive these funds or their proceeds?
When talking about the assets, we have to differentiate between the private assets belonging to Russian individuals or companies and the state assets belonging to the Russian Central Bank. Regarding private assets, CHF 7.4 billion are frozen in Switzerland. However, there is no legal basis in Switzerland – and, for that matter, also in the European Union – to confiscate such private assets of licit origin. It would be contrary to Swiss law.
As for state assets, the amount immobilized in Switzerland is also almost the same, CHF 7.45 billion. The European Union has decided at some point to use the extraordinaryunplanned profit generated by them – the so-called windfall profits. If theseThese assets are deposited in what are known ascentral securities depositories in EU countries, thenand this setup generates these extraordinary or windfall profits.
But the situation in Switzerland is somewhat different, becausebecause the assets of the Russian Central Bank are not held by the Swiss Central Securities Depository, but by commercial banks. This means that in commercial banks they do not generate such extraordinary profits.
Nevertheless, Switzerland is closely following the discussions taking place in the European Union – and also in the United Kingdom, by the way – on the possibility of using the Russian Central Bank’s assets to finance a recovery reparation loan for Ukraine.
In any case, the Swiss government wouldwill ultimately take a decision based on Swiss law, international law, and taking into account the need to preserve the stability of financial markets.
What is Switzerland’s current sanctions policy against Russia? Whose approach do you follow – that of the United States, the EU, or Ukraine?
We decided to follow the sanctions policy adopted by the European Union, and we are in close and constructive contact with our partners based on common goals and values.
On October 29, we adopted further sanctions against Russia, implementing the 18th sanction package adopted by the EU in July. We are currently evaluating the possibility of adopting additional measures based on the EU’s 19th package.
And as I just said before, the assets, the private assets of sanctioned Russian individuals or through companies, are frozen in Switzerland, and also these sanctioned persons cannot travel into Switzerland or through Switzerland., they are banned from traveling.
At what stage is the current review of the Swiss arms-export law? How interested is Switzerland in supplying its defense industry products to the Ukrainian market or in creating joint ventures in this sector?
Now, regarding the export or re-export of war material, let me start by outlining the legal framework, since it iscan be quite complex.
First of all, the legal framework is the 1907 Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States. According to this convention, Switzerland, as a neutral country, is prohibited from exporting war material to a country that is a belligerent in an armed conflict. For private exports by companies, the principle of equality of treatment between belligerents must be observed under neutrality law.
Regarding the re-export of war material, for example, if Switzerland sells war material to a country X, that country signs a declaration agreeing to request Switzerland’s permission before re-exporting these weapons. If country X wishes to re-export Swiss-origin war material to a belligerent in an armed conflict, Switzerland, under neutrality law, must refuse or prohibit such re-export.
Switzerland also has a domestic War Material Act [Federal law on war material], which contains the same provisions: exports of war material to a belligerent are prohibited. Equally, if a country that purchased war material from Switzerland requests re-export to a belligerent, Switzerland cannot approve it.
In short, both the domestic War Material Act and international neutrality law prohibit Switzerland from allowing re-exports to Ukraine under these circumstances.
The Swiss Parliament has been debating this issue for some time, and last week it decided to allow the re-export of weapons under certain conditions. However, further clarification is still needed, and a referendum is likely, in which casemeaning that ultimately the Swiss population will have to vote on this.
In June last year, the upper chamber of the Swiss Parliament (Le Conseil des États) rejected a proposal for a federal emergency contribution of CHF 15 billion to guarantee Switzerland’s security and peace in Europe amid the war against Ukraine – including CHF 10.1 billion for the Swiss army and CHF 5 billion for Ukraine by 2030. Has this decision been reconsidered? How much does it currently hinder funding for Ukraine?
No, no, that’s not the sameIndeed, there was a discussion in the Parliament about creating a special fund to cover additional needs, on the one hand for the Swiss Armed Forces until 2030, and on the other hand for the reconstruction of Ukraine.
It is true that, in the end, this fund was rejected by the Parliament. However, regarding the reconstruction of Ukraine, this had no negative impact on its financing. The Swiss government announced in spring 2024 its intention to allocate 5 billion Swiss francs for the reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine over a 12-year period, until 2036.
The first tranche of СРА 1.5 billion has already been approved by the Swiss Parliament last year, covering the period 2025-2028.
If we're talking about this CHF 1.5 billion, how is the implementation progressing and what level of support is expected for this year compared with previous and for next year?
Yes, I think the adoption of the country programme at the beginning of this year was one of the major milestones in our bilateral relations in 2025. this year
It also underlines Switzerland’s strategic commitment to continue supporting Ukraine, which we have been doing for more than 25 years, particularly in its reconstruction and recovery efforts over the next four years.
Moreover, it demonstrates Switzerland’s reliability, as this CHF 1.5 billion has been approved by the Swiss Parliament, meaning the funds are officially allocated. Many of our projects also benefit from multi-year funding, which ensures continuity and stability in financing.
To answer your question about the funds: this year, the total amount spent will be around CHF 220 million, increasing to CHF 315 million next year from this package.
Which reconstruction project in Ukraine is Switzerland already supporting and what new projects are planned?
Our country programme envisions interventions at three levels: short-term measures to increase the resilience of the country, medium-term support for ongoing reforms, and long-term support for reconstruction. We are already working across all three levels.
Let’s start with the reform level. These are many reforms we have been supporting for years. Our support focuses on essential reforms, such as public services provided to citizens in health, education, water management, orand urban development.
One of our key areas of intervention is digital transformation. We are now one of the top donors in this field and are proud to have supported the development of the DIIA app from the very beginning. Ukraine can also be proud of its achievements in this area.
Another reformarea we have supported for more than 20 years is decentralization – a field where Swiss expertise is particularly relevant. Many experts in Ukraine would agree that decentralization was likely a key factor in the country’s resilience at the start of the war.
Humanitarian demining is another important topic and a prerequisite for further reconstruction. We have a special package of CHF 100 million covering 2020–2024-2027. This year alone, for example, we provided SESU (the State Emergency Service of Ukraine) with three free remote demining vehicles.
We have also stepped up our contributions in the health sector, supported stepped up our support to theour DECIDE project in education, committed CHF 30 million for projects enhancing the competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy, and delivered trams to Lviv and Vinnytsia. We aalso just joined the re now in the process of joining the International Coalition on Shelters, which underlines our ongoing engagement on this key needwork over the past three years.
Through this initiative, we have supported the rehabilitation of 90 shelters in Ukraine, allowing children to access safe offline education. I personally visited one school in Chernihiv on the first day of school, September 1. There we contributed not only to the rehabilitation of the shelter but also implemented parallel projects on school nutrition, school governance, and a career guidance hub. It is a multi-dimensional support approach. Unfortunately, on that day, an air alert occurred as soon as the children gathered. It was sad, but seeing them safely spend their first day together after the summer break, in a fully equipped shelter, was reassuring. The shelter was designed not just for safety but also for holding classes underground.
We try to avoid simple "hardware projects" and always whenever possible embed them in broader initiatives addressing governance, education, nutritiondigital transformation, or energy resilience. For example, solar panels to ensure continuous energy supply. With this approach we aim at sustainable solutions that make a real impact on their communities.
Do you focus on specific cities? Because sometimes our partners do.
No, we don’t focus on specific cities. We focus on our thematic priorities. The combination of short-term, mid-term, and long-term interventions allows us to address needs across the whole country – from humanitarian assistance closer to the frontline to reform and recovery projects, including private sector initiatives.
Regarding short-term resilience, this covers emergency humanitarian projects, such as repairing damaged windows and roofs, restoring critical infrastructure, water management, and supporting small businesses to remain operational in affected areas. I remember visiting Kharkiv over a year ago and seeing a small business run by a displaced woman displaced from a museum. Thanks to a small grant, she was able to open and run a bakery in Kharkiv.
In NovemberJust two weeks ago, I visited Sumy and saw beneficiaries of projects we implemented immediately after the devastating missile strike on Palm Sunday. We visited a hospital, a children’s rehabilitation center, and families who had their windows repaired, living just meters from the impact site. I talked to a this man, together with his granddaughter. It was a great satisfaction to hear that thanks the speedy intervention of our local partners, they had received help in just a few days. whoand they received help through our partners in just a few days.
To answer your question, what is common to all these projects is that my team and myselfwe travel across the country, including frontline regions, maintaining close contact with regional and local authorities and supporting local partners. This approach allows us to provide an efficient and rapid response tailored to the concrete needs of people on the ground. Local partners understand the context in which they operate, and we have always advocated for support for their immense work.
For example, we advocated for the provision ofde a minimal Duty of care package for humanitarian workers, including life insurance for volunteers, because these are the people who, at great personal risk, perform extraordinary work helping the most vulnerable on the front lines. We are also exploring ways to expand this support to additional categories of people.
What about Swiss investors entering or leaving Ukraine? What support or insurance can the Swiss government offer them?
Switzerland has been quite a forerunner in exploring how the private sector can contribute to recovery projects in Ukraine. At the beginning of this year, we launched a call for proposals with a total budget of CHF 100 million, inviting Swiss companies already present in Ukraine to submit projects for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. Together with the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and colleagues from my team, we selected 12 projects in the fields of housing, health, mobility, and energy. Final contract clarifications are now underway, with the aim of starting implementation in early 2026.
This scheme has generated so much interest that a second call for proposals along similar lines is planned for early 2026, with a volume of CHF 200 million.
We also want to include engage Swiss companies not yet present in Ukraine. For this, a new legal basis is required. A state-to-state agreement was signed in Rome at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025RC, and the ratification process is now underway. We hope this agreement can enter into force in the second half of 2026, enabling even larger projects with companies new to Ukraine. In the meantime, we are already informing interested companies about opportunities and challenges of doing business in Ukraine. For example, in April, we organized a business mission with the representatives of 16several Swiss companies and associations visiting Kyiv, Lviv, and Vinnytsia.
There are also private investments without state involvement, madeespecially by companies already operating in Ukraine. The four largest investments made in 2024-2025 alone amounted to over CHF 100 million in the consumable goods industry and infrastructure management. I want to commend these companies for their strategic vision and trust in the Ukrainian market.
Finally, I want to highlight that the majority of Swiss companies present in Ukraine in February 2022 did not leave. They stayed despite the difficulties, adapted their business models, retained employees, preserved jobs, and continued paying taxes.
If we're talking about support from Switzerland for the, energy system running, can you give us a little more detail about it?
We recently contributed CHF 18 million to the Ukrainian Resilience Energy Fund. In addition, and for quite some time, we have been supporting local municipalities and public utilities with projects to improve energy efficiency. Improving efficiency also helps to relieve some of the pressure on the energy grid. That's very important. Third, Ukrainian authorities have approached us to provide equipment for the protection of critical energy infrastructure. We are currently examining how best to respond to this request.
And a very difficult question for me and for our country now, about the corruption scandal, but I need to ask you about it. Does the scandal hurt Ukraine's investment effectiveness? Or does it show more transparency? What do you see?
Well, you know, I think no country is completely immune to corruption. What is important is that anti-corruption bodies can operate independently to uncover such cases and help maintain or restore trust between citizens and the state, as well as trust for foreign investors. The fact that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) are able to investigate high-level corruption cases demonstrates that the anti-corruption system is functioning. And that's positive.
On our side, Switzerland has been supporting good governance and anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine for several years. For example, we provide expertise and support in ARMA’s recruitment processes, offering hands-on and concrete assistance. This is another tangible example of our support for anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine.
The key point is to uncover the cases so that theas the trust of foreign investors remains.
Photo: Interfax-Ukraine / Oleksandr Zubko
Employment challenges: language, childcare, and diplomas
According to Eurostat, as of the end of March this year Switzerland hosted 70,520 Ukrainian refugees with temporary protection status – an annual increase of 3,890 or 5.8%. What is the current dynamic?
Аctually, if you look at the last 24 months, or the past two years, the number has been quite stable in Switzerland. It has generally ranged between 67,000 and 70,000, as you mentioned, and you are right – it has slightly increased this year.
Over the past months, we have seen about 1,000 requests for special protection status from young Ukrainian men aged 18-22, between September and November.
Has it accelerated after Ukraine allowed men aged 15-22 to travel abroad – a decision criticized, for example, in neighboring Germany?
IWell, of course, it is a decision made by Ukraine. Essentially, it is Ukraine’s decision. As I mentioned, the number of arrivals in Switzerland is not very large; it has only slightly contributed to And the overall increase in the number of refugees in the country was not very significant.
How many Ukrainians are already employed?
This year, the federal government set a new goal: 50% employment for refugees who have been in Switzerland for three years. Experience has shown that achieving this goal takes longer than initially anticipated. Therefore, the new criterion focuses on the length of stay. Currently, the overall employment rate among refugees is about 36%. However, if we consider only those who have been in Switzerland for more than three years – essentially those who arrived in 2022 – the rate is already quite close to the stated goal.
Why does it take longer, and what are the barriers to employment?
First, a very basic factor is language skills. For many jobs, either German or French is required, depending on the region. For someone starting from zero, reaching the necessary level typically takes at least two years.
Second, there is a shortage of childcare facilities for small children in Switzerland. This is particularly important because the largest category of refugees consists of mothers alone with their children. Without childcare options, they cannot enter the workforce.
Third, the recognition of diplomas can be a barrier, sometimes creating unrealistic expectations.
This is the current situation.
Does the economy of Switzerland benefit at all from these Ukrainian migrants?
I don’t know if there is data on this, or if there have been any studies done. I've heard that other countries have such data, but we don't yet have any concrete figure on benefits.
Does Switzerland provide assistance for voluntary return from refugees?
Yes, in case of voluntary returns, we provide a one-off repatriation package either to individual persons or to families.
Well, how has the decision to restrict protection status for people from seven Western Ukrainian regions been applied in practical practice?
Yes, thank you for the question. First, let me say that the special protection status was extended at the end of October until the end of March 2027, in line with the EU decision.
Regarding your question, this change was actually requested by our Parliament, and the Swiss government implemented it. Since November 1 this year, a distinction is made between Ukrainian regions where return is considered reasonable and regions where the security situation or infrastructure conditions do not allow for a safe return.
Of course, as we have seen with the recent devastating Russian missile attack on a housing block in Ternopil, no region in Ukraine can be considered completely safe. Nevertheless, some regions are proportionally less affected than others.
Currently, seven regions are considered those where return can reasonably be envisioned: Zakarpattia, Lutsk, Rivne, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil.
In practice, this means that people from these seven regions applying for special protection status from now on will, in principle, no longer receive it. However, it is important to underline that nothing changes for those already in Switzerland who arrived before November from these regions – they can stay as before.I mean, they can stay in Switzerland as it is.