Partial military service: a strategic response to the mobilisation crisis and strengthening Ukraine's negotiating position
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Yuriy Honcharenko, founder of the InfoLight.UA Research and Analytical Group
It appears that today we can exhale and calmly discuss the visit of the President of Ukraine to Washington and his dispute with Donald Trump and J.D. Vance.
I would rather not be an “expert on all issues” and say what was a provocation, what was a set-up, whether there was a trap and for whom. We have no information about the course of the negotiations, so we can only talk about what we saw and heard.
And one of the key moments of this conversation, which was seen by the whole world, was the US Vice President's statement that Ukraine had problems with mobilisation and had no one to fight. These words escalated the conversation and ultimately forced the President of Ukraine to deny it without having any convincing arguments.
Of course, Dee Vance's words that he gets information because he looks at something somewhere also created a bunch of memes, the most successful of which I found to be about "visiting Ukraine with Google Maps". However, this does not negate the fact that since mid-2023, the topic of mobilisation in Ukraine has been one of the main topics in the coverage of our war. And it's not about the queues to the military commissariat, but about various scandals.
How Russia hijacked the mobilisation narrative
Is it any wonder that back in the summer of 2023, it was Elon Musk who called for a halt to aiding Ukraine because of the illegal military mobilisation taking place in our country? In this regard, their narratives were indeed identical to Russia's, but was it only because of their desire that this perspective was spread?
Research and analysis group InfoLight.UA back then drew attention to the fact to the fact that Ukraine was losing the information front in this area and that this could become a problem and a reason for stopping aid. What happened in the autumn of 2023 with US aid was not directly related to the issue of mobilisation, but it cannot be ruled out that it was also one of the arguments.
Today, tweets to a Western audience with examples of “busification” get tens of millions of views. And it is currently impossible to explain that this all started with Russian productions and is being implemented through Russian influence. Because the video shows real Ukrainian soldiers who found themselves in a situation of “negative feedback”, when the need for forced mobilisation leads to such incidents.
Closed circle of issues with the current mobilisation system
Difficult conditions of service and the lack of clear prospects for demobilization reduce the number of volunteers, leading to increased forced mobilisation. This, in turn, causes even more resistance in society and further decreases motivation. The situation is exacerbated by a growing sense of injustice among both civilians and soldiers who have been at the front for a long time without rotation.
The situation is particularly acute in small communities, where there has been an increase in both non-violent resistance to mobilisation and the use of force. All of this creates a favorable environment for deepening the divisions in Ukrainian society, which is actively exploited by Russian propaganda.
The existing system of mobilisation has reached a dead end, where increased coercive measures only worsen the situation. It is becoming apparent that a fundamentally new approach is needed to solve the complex problem, which would consider both the military needs of the state and social realities, in fact, a new social contract on mobilisation.
A decision supported by mathematics and sociology: partial military service
The InfoLight.UA research and analytical group within the Ukrainian Security Club has developed a systematic solution that has a mathematical basis, has been tested by sociologists and tested on those who avoid mobilisation. We do not see that there is any alternative that can give similar results.
The introduction of a system of partial military service could attract between 300,000 and 800,000 volunteers. A study by Active Group showed that 34.2% of Ukrainians are ready to be voluntarily mobilized if a model of partial military service is introduced. Of these, 7.8% of respondents said they would “definitely mobilize” and 26.4% said they would “rather mobilize”.
International experience and adaptation to Ukrainian realities
The model of partial military service is not an entirely new concept. Similar approaches have been successfully implemented in Switzerland, where citizens spend short periods of time on military service, combining it with civilian life. Israel has a system of regular reserve training. Finland maintains a high defense capability through a combination of compulsory service and periodic training of reservists.
Adapting this experience to Ukrainian realities would create a flexible system that considers the peculiarities of our war and society. Importantly, under such a system, even those who are currently avoiding mobilisation would receive a clear and acceptable perspective of combining military service and civilian life.
Economic benefits of partial military service
One of the key advantages of the proposed reform is the preservation of the country's economic potential. Instead of completely removing the able-bodied population from the economy, partial military service allows citizens to continue their professional activities during periods of civilian life.
Such a system allows businesses to adapt and plan their HR policies knowing the periods of staff rotation. This will reduce the negative impact of mobilisation on the economy, preserve tax revenues and maintain economic activity, a factor critical to Ukraine's resilience in a prolonged war.
Specific implementation plan
We propose the following steps to implement the reform:
- In the next 1–2 weeks: Establishment of a working group to develop the concept of partial military service with the participation of representatives of the OP, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, our experts, and analysts.
- Within a month: Developing and submitting relevant legislative amendments to the Verkhovna Rada with an urgent review procedure.
- In parallel: Launch a pilot project in 2–3 brigades to test rotation mechanisms and organizational aspects.
- After the legislative framework is approved: Gradual roll-out of the system to the entire Defense Forces, starting with the brigades with the longest service periods.
- During implementation: A strong communication campaign both domestically and to international partners, demonstrating a structural change in the approach to mobilisation.
Strengthening Ukraine's negotiating position in the international arena
Since December 2024, we have been saying that with Trump coming to official power in the United States, Ukraine needs to strengthen its negotiating position. Yesterday, J.D. Vance pressed on Ukraine's main pain point—the mobilisation process, which has been hijacked by Russia. If President Zelenskyy's arguments had included a reform that ensures 300–800 volunteers, yesterday's debate would have ended at the very beginning, or not at all.
If within the next week or two, Volodymyr Zelenskyy comes out with a statement that Ukraine is launching such a powerful reform, it will cool down hot heads both in the US and the enemy, and demonstrate our strategic stability.
We are appealing to the state, the President's Office, and MPs with an urgent proposal to consider our reform, invite us to working groups, and use our developments. If we assume a negative scenario and increased pressure, there is not much time left. But we can launch a process that will give Ukraine 300-800 thousand volunteers.
You can read about how Russia influenced the mobilisation in Ukraine in our research, which we have divided into four publications: First, second., third, fourth.