An exclusive interview of Acting SBU Chief Vasyl Maliuk with the Interfax-Ukraine News Agency

By Oksana Gerontieva

 

For 100 days already, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has been actually headed by Vasyl Maliuk, a brigadier general who has got combat experience, an understanding of internal and external national security threats, as well as peculiarities of counterintelligence.

A great deal of what the Ukrainian special service actually does in wartime is not presented to the public. Maliuk himself is a non-media person. However, there is a huge demand from the public not only for information about enemy agents and collaborators, but also for clarification of processes and phenomena directly in the SBU. Because it is about the trust of Ukrainians and the victory of Ukraine.

 

"I PERSONALLY DETAINED BETRAYER KULINICH"

First of all, there is a question that interests all of Ukraine. The Crimean Bridge was recently on fire. At first, there were rumors that this was the SBU's hand, then information appeared that it could be the result of internal confrontations in Russia. Russian investigators have their own version... So, what happened to the bridge?

I would like to start with the fact that the Russians are demonstrating their lack of professionalism here as well – I am talking about the sham investigation they are conducting into the incident on the Crimean Bridge. In their "investigation" they came to the conclusion that my colleague in the power structure Kyrylo Budanov and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry, in general, were allegedly involved in the blowing up of the bridge.

I promise you that it is not true. We realize that the Russians are actually far from reality. And what happened in reality – we will be able to talk about this in detail after the victory.

A lot of things are going on. As for the Crimean Bridge, apparently, some truck was refueled with the wrong fuel, and they have what they have. Time will dot the i's.

 

In general, the "cotton" ["bavovna" – Ukrainian slang for explosions in the territory of the aggressor state or the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine] and the "self-liquidation" of collaborators often happen in the occupied territories recently. Does the SBU have anything to do with this?

It's just that we, Ukrainians, love "cotton" very much. Even in this office, there are cotton flowers in the vase. They please the eye. But is it our fault that the Russians do not know how to treat it properly? I think they will have many more opportunities to learn how to do this.

Something explodes here and there in the temporarily occupied territories. Someone drinks poor-quality coffee, someone refuels with low-quality fuel. It is clear that certain processes are taking place. I cannot reveal the cards and tell how it happens and who is behind it at the moment, as it may endanger the patriots who care. Everything has its own time – we will talk in detail after the victory.

Can you see the picture hanging on the wall? The Cossack Mamai – it was presented by my colleagues. This cossack sits on the skulls of our enemies – this is the only prospect we can offer to those who have invaded our land.

 

Can you tell me something about the work of Ukrainian agents?

For obvious reasons, I will not reveal the specifics, so as not to decipher the forms and methods, not to substitute the sources that work behind enemy lines, including in the Russian Federation.

At the same time, I would like to thank the women separately. These are the best agents, real Amazons in the field of counterintelligence, who conduct mega-filigree agency penetrations, many operations are successfully implemented thanks to the presence of women among agents.

This is an invaluable experience. Some of them are worth of a monument during their lifetime. Some of them have already gone through plastic surgery and changing the identification data so as not to be exposed to danger.

This is one of the areas of our activity that we are improving and developing.

 

Where exactly did the war meet you? What did you do in the early days?

The war found me in the position of Deputy Interior Minister. We quickly met with our fellows from the National Guard, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry, distributed the tasks and departed to meet the enemy in the Hostomel direction. Our task was to take all measures to prevent the enemy from entering the capital.

I will not tell everything, but we were engaged in various tasks – blowing up roads, approaches to Kyiv. We worked for about two days, partial chaos began in the capital at that time – including the "friendly fire". We had to make urgent management decisions so that everything worked like an orchestra.

A respective headquarters was set up. The SBU, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Main Intelligence Directorate divided Kyiv into ten sectors, and the region – into seven sectors. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) also joined us later – its special forces and detectives. And on February 28, I returned to the SBU as Deputy Chief.

The main task was to cut enemy logistics on the approaches to Kyiv, in the Chornobyl direction. For this purpose, we quickly created an SBU unit, and the agent forces of caring fellow citizens were attached to it. The enemy's rear control post was destroyed, and much more was done. But, unfortunately, there were also our first losses.

Subsequently, I urgently organized the implementation of operational combat tasks in the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson directions. Therefore, I made a lot of trips there.

Also, we immediately established an effective interaction with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which now brings powerful results – the enemy feels them daily, when their count the number of destroyed personnel and equipment. Together we conduct successful and multi-step operations. I would like to thank our fellows for their cooperation.

 

You have been heading the SBU for 100 days. What has changed in the SBU in these few months? Do you already have a clear vision of what needs to be improved at work?

A lot has changed, and I think it is visible to the naked eye. Take even the latest results – high-profile special operations of the SBU, resistance to the special services of the Russian Federation and exposure of intelligence networks, investigations of war crimes, detention of collaborators, return of our defenders, the exchange of [former Member of Parliament Viktor] Medvedchuk for Azov fighters. All of this is the SBU's contribution to the victory.

But first of all, the Service is self-purifying. This is extremely important, especially in wartime. We do everything possible for this.

Among the iconic examples is the detention of agents, so-called "moles" in the ranks of the SBU.

I will name several top, "recognized" state traitors. One of them is Colonel Kulinich, whom we detained together with the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI).

Kulinich is the former head of the Crimean main committee, an officer on special assignments of the SBU Head. The Service carried out an unprecedented filigree development and further implementation, made an agent and technical penetration into the ranks of the FSB [Russian Federal Security Service]. We obtained all the files where he actually reported to Moscow information, including secret information, about the situation in our country, in the Service, how they tried to influence various processes. But we are not disclosing the details yet, as the investigation is ongoing, everything will become clear in the future.

Another state traitor is Colonel Riabukha, the head of Kharkiv Institute for the Training of Legal Personnel. He was supposed to teach the younger generation, but in reality he was working for the enemy. Not just an agent, that is, someone who collects information himself, but he was a resident. He had other persons in contact.

He was also detained and gave incriminating evidence. By the way, a detail that demonstrates the level of cynicism – he had the national anthem of the Russian Federation as his alarm clock ringtone on his smartphone.

There are other detainees, including an employee of the analytical unit of Kharkiv administration, who passed information to the enemy.

If we do not discover these rats on board, then all our further operations against the enemy are doomed to failure. That is why we put a lot of emphasis on this.

Today, the internal security unit has been completely reformatted and performs exactly such counterintelligence tasks.

I say frankly – I am a member of all operational and investigative groups, I worked on the Kulinich case myself, reported to the President and personally detained him.

 

And what about SBU General Naumov, who helped the enemy and escaped from Ukraine? What steps are being taken to bring him to justice?

Naumov is currently in Serbia. The relevant criminal proceedings against him are in the SBI. We fully support the investigation: the SBU and I personally do everything necessary for a high-quality investigation. Everything else will be clear according to the results of the investigation.

 

Another well-known traitor in the ranks of the SBU is Dudin, the former head of the Kharkiv Department.

Yes, a famous character. For me, as the head of the special service, this is an unpleasant story.

The Dudin case is being investigated by the SBI, while the SBU also carries out specific assignments. He is suspected of treason, I think the President has said everything comprehensively and meaningfully about him.

Instead of adequately reacting to the personnel decision, Dudin began to engage in political maneuvering. I do not want to harm the investigation, but I will say a few points. Dudin, "a great hero and defender of Kharkiv", left the city for Kyiv on February 25, leaving the staff virtually without a leader at the most critical moment, and returned only on March 2.

And after that, he allowed himself to tell some things in public and record a video message.

 

Did the presence of these traitors, the "moles" in the SBU seriously affect the development of events at the beginning of the war and Ukraine's loss of territories? Many questions "what happened to the south, to Kherson region, why did this happen"?..

You mentioned Kherson region. I would approach the issue more broadly. If we consider the functionality of the SBU, the Service is not the main entity responsible for the defense of one or another region – there are a corresponding headquarters, the military, and other related law enforcement agencies.

The SBU left Kherson together with all the others. It is clear that it was difficult to resist tanks with machine guns in hands. But, at the same time, there were certain questions for Mr. Kryvoruchko, who headed Kherson at that time. I cannot voice everything, but you remember what personnel reshuffle the President made and how he commented on it. I and the entire Service are completely in solidarity. The head of the regional administration has no right to behave like that!

By the way, the deployment of the Crimean main department, headed by Kulinich, was also located in Kherson.

 

"PUTIN IS A SPECIAL SERVICE EMPLOYEE. HE HAD BEEN PENETRATING OUR COUNTRY THROUGH INTELLIGENCE AGENTS FOR 20 YEARS"

What main direction of FSB's attack on Ukraine do you see analyzing the enemy agents' network?

To date, more than 360 agents have been identified, documented, and detained. We are talking about agents of various calibers: from top state traitors, such as Medvedchuk, to ordinary people who collect coordinates of the deployment and movement of the AFU.

Enemy agents work in different directions: both in the military and in the law enforcement sectors, and in politics, there is also the collection of legal information from open sources. They have quite a multifaceted activity.

As for the military sector, with the assistance of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry, we detained a major general, who retired from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry of Ukraine, who collecting and passing information to the enemy. During the detention, he resisted, "heroically" tried to shoot back, but was wounded in the shoulder and detained.

This is one example. Putin is a special service employee. And we understand that he had been penetrating our country through intelligence agents for 20 years. In fact, the SBU is the tool, the sword that cuts off these agents' tentacles.

Without any exaggeration, I will say that at the beginning of the war and until February 24, a lot of measures were taken to detain such agents.

 

Do employees of the SBU head office also undergo a check for possible work for the enemy?

Of course, there is a set of measures. For obvious reasons, I cannot tell the details, but these are both counterintelligence interviews and polygraphs – a constant, continuous process. We not only do our best, we stand on guard and suppress any signs [of betrayal].

Yes, there are still some elements that we are working on. We need a bit more time to finish with this as well.

 

Currently, is there already a more or less clear picture of whether everything had been done on the eve of the war to avoid it or to be as ready as possible?

In general, the country was preparing for various scenarios. It is clear that certain things were implemented practically "from the wheels", it was inevitable. At the same time, it is an invaluable experience, and we continue to gain it daily.

By the way, as the head of the SBU, I am currently actively developing the institute of mentoring – when the leader himself participates in development and operations, and then passes on his experience to subordinates: in counterintelligence, procedural, operational and combat activities – at all service levels.

 

"WE HAVE OUR SPECIALISTS IN ALL HOT SPOTS OF THE WAR"

Let's briefly make it clear what exactly the SBU does directly in the war...

The SBU carries out various tasks. They include operational and combat, counterintelligence, counter-sabotage, anti-terrorist operations.

Participation in hot spots, from Snake Island to Severodonetsk – our specialists are everywhere. These are top military personnel, who perform the most difficult tasks.

Today, the Counterintelligence Department of the SBU works very effectively. Military counterintelligence is at the same high level as well – it has been reformatted completely. These are people who live on the frontline. A unit was formed, which performs special tasks, including the destruction of enemy equipment. They show fantastic results – 93 tanks alone have been destroyed, and we are waiting for 100.

But this is a war – for today, regrettably, we have 19 losses. These are our heroes who gave their lives, fulfilled their military and professional duty, and did everything for our victory. These are not only employees of the Alfa special force, but also employees of other units.

 

At what stage does the SBU "enter" the liberated territories and how exactly does it check the population for cooperation with the occupiers? How does this happen?

First, the AFU and our special forces work. As soon as the territory is cleared, including of explosive devices, SBU counterintelligence officers and other units enter. And work with the local population begins.

At first, this is banal communication, and when certain primary unmasking signs appear, a different work begins – monitoring of means of communication, polygraph, and so on. And when we already get signs of possible involvement in collaboration with the enemy, a further legal assessment is carried out. And in the future, such a person may be held accountable.

There are also witnesses of the military aggression of the Russian Federation, and victims. Depending on the participation in certain processes, a person receives the status of either a witness, or a victim, or a suspect.

 

How should actions of ordinary residents be differentiated: where is the line between trying to survive and treason in the legal sense?

It is clear that our fellow citizens remain in the temporarily occupied territories. Some of them are really unable to leave, although I recommend everyone to flee those territories.

If a person remained there, he or she should not help the enemy by deliberately taking any actions in its favor. Doctors and utility workers are not automatically liable because they perform their functions: a doctor must provide help, and a utility worker must clean the streets.

And if a person intentionally commits something, then it is clear that his or her actions are qualified in line with the articles of the Criminal Code.

Everything is very individual, each situation is decomposed into molecules, a legal assessment is provided. If a person committed some actions at gunpoint and did not have an intention, then he or she is not the subject of committing a crime and will not be held accountable in the future.

 

It is clear with doctors, but what if it is, for example, a hospital chief?

If he or she performed any administrative functions in favor of the enemy, made decisions, then he or she is one of those who contributed and will be liable in line with the law.

 

And what about teachers?

Just the same. If they switched to the enemy side and teach the "Rushka's" [Ukrainian slang for "Russia"] program, and not our, Ukrainian, then they are also liable.

 

"WE HAVE WORKED OVER MORE THAN 160 GROUPS WITH SIGNS OF SABOTAGE AND RECONNAISSANCE GROUP"

The FSB implements a rather effective filtering system in the occupied territories. They check a lot of people there...

We also have a definition of "filtration in de-occupied territories". But in the course of communication with the President, we came to the point that we may officially replace this term with "sieving", since "filtration" contains a certain post-Soviet punitive flavor.

As for the Russians – yes, they carry out filtering in full. And not just filtering. People disappear. And I would not call it efficiency, it is rather an aggressive warfare.

 

Approximately how much time Ukrainian law enforcers need to carry out the "sieving" of a de-occupied settlement, for example, Balaklia?

This process is continuous. In fact, people work there even now. Both investigators and case officers. Two weeks ago, we neutralized another sabotage and reconnaissance group (SRG) in that area. It was a classic SRG from among Russian special forces. Three of them were detained, two were liquidated. Detainees are now giving incriminating testimony in the treasure trove of evidence for future international trials.

And here is an important thing – it is important to differentiate between the actual "SRG" and "a group with certain features of SRG". Because we have a lot of "couch experts" who talk about the number of SRGs, their detention, but they themselves have no idea what it is, how it works and how to detain them. In general, if we talk about groups with features of SRG, the SBU has worked over more than 160 of them since the beginning of the war.

 

By the way, about the SRGs and their large number in Kyiv before the war...

Those were precisely not the SRGs themselves, but groups with separate features of SRGs. The classic SRG is a group of enemy special forces that performs sabotage and reconnaissance tasks.

In our country, everyone with a weapon in their hands began to be called the SRG. We have showed an example of a classic SRG in Balaklia.

 

"WHEN KARIM KHAN SAW OUR MATERIALS, HE SAID THEY WERE 'HARD AND HEAVY'"

You pointed out the importance of collecting evidence to prosecute war criminals not only in national courts, but also in international ones. Is it about the legal correctness of gathering them so that in the future the evidence is recognized as acceptable?

It is very important for us to show the whole world not just emotions, but the procedural evidentiary steps of the enemy's illegal activities, its aggression.

This is under the jurisdiction of the SBU, thus our Main Investigation Department documents everything.

There is one main criminal proceeding and there are local proceedings in the regions. All the evidence is collected. And we are talking not only about publicly collected evidence, that is inspections of the scene of the incident and others, but also a large amount of secretly collected [evidence] obtained during secret investigative activities. These are both video and audio, intercepts of occupiers' conversations.

When Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Karim Khan saw our materials, he said they were "hard and heavy", which means that this type of crime was documented very professionally.

High-quality documentation of all crimes committed by the Russian Federation in the frontline territories is carried out. SBU investigators work there, but I would also like to note the work of other law enforcement agencies. Everyone participated in this documentation process – police investigators (I especially note them), NABU, and the SBI. The procedural guidance is carried out by the prosecutor's office, the main coordination is direct responsibility of Prosecutor General Mr. [Andriy] Kostin. He takes care of the process as a whole because this is a very important case.

As of today, we have collected openly and secretly all possible evidence, including involvement of high-ranking Russian officials. For example, Kadyrov and all his henchmen. He was notified of suspicion. And this is not just some "political" suspicion but an important legal step for the further development of all proceedings.

 

How does the SBU cooperate with the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry?

We have full interaction. Between me personally and the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate, at the middle management level, as well as among the employees of the lower level.

We work in unison. It is clear that intelligence and counterintelligence actually go shoulder to shoulder in wartime.

This is both formal and informal cooperation. We get intelligence from the Main Intelligence Directorate, share the information we have, and hold joint meetings. It is clear that we conduct most of the operations independently, however, there are some operations for which we join forces. Not only the Main Intelligence Directorate is involved, everything depends on the tasks. Everyone has their own front within their functionality.

There is a concept of "friend's shoulder" in military science. This is not some phraseology, this is a real term. As it turned out, a continuous trench is much more effective than a single one. It is because when you feel the shoulders on both sides you are not so scared even when a tank is moving in your direction. This is how it also works in real work.

And this is in contrast to the situation that our enemy has got between the special services – conflicts between the Main Intelligence Directorate and the FSB and so on. If you hear about some misunderstandings between our special services and law enforcement agencies, you should know that this is not true, it is a special information operation of the Russians.

By the way, as regards the SIO – special information operations – and the IPSO – information and psychological operations. It is clear that we also conduct them. However, I want you to understand the conceptual difference: the enemy aims to show false information and slander Ukraine. We do the opposite – we show the truth as much as possible and prove it, including to the citizens of the Russian Federation. For example, we show another torture room that we discovered, and they say that we supposedly did these horrors ourselves. But the world still sees the truth.

 

"THE PRESIDENT SETS CLEAR TASKS AND WE PERFORM THEM"

Cybercriminals and tracking their activities, including in advance – are you satisfied with the results of cyber experts' work?

Our cybersecurity direction is on top today. The department is headed by Illia Vitiuk, a true professional and patriot, a graduate of the SBU Academy, which I also graduated at one time. When I took my position, I told him at once that a cybersecurity specialist should be not just an IT expert wearing glasses. We need a mix of a special agent and IT specialist. We have a common vision and we are currently developing such a model.

Moreover, SBU cybersecurity specialists effectively carry out their tasks directly in the frontline territories, which is very important for us.

In general, we show solid results – we have localized more than 3,500 cyberattacks and destroyed more than 35 bot farms since the beginning of the war.

In general, our cybersecurity specialists did an unprecedented job – unfortunately, I cannot tell you all the details at the moment but we regularly block the enemy's communication in the territory of Ukraine. Hence, the Russians experience communication problems, which causes a lot of troubles to them during the war.

 

Who currently wins on the information and cyber front?

This is us. I am a hundred percent sure. Even Western special services considered the Russian cyber forces to be top-notch. However, since the beginning of the war, we can see that they do not have advantages. Yes, there are some hostile cyberattacks, however, our employees successfully localize them.

Of course, the assistance of foreign partners is of great importance. Starting from the material and technical base and ending with timely intelligence received from them, our success also depends on this direction.

At the same time, I want to emphasize that despite the significant support of our international partners, there are no foreign units in Ukraine. There are only individual indifferent foreigners who came to help Ukraine. But it is not of a mass nature as propagandists try to show.

The same are the myths about "the management from the outside" or coordination. We have Commander-in-Chief – Mr. Zelensky, who sets clear tasks and we perform them. A priori, there can be no coordination with anyone else – we are a sovereign state.

Certain heads of the top Western special services say, while visiting us, "we are taking an example from you now." And it is very important for us, it motivates us to even greater achievements and our joint victory.

 

Can we say that Russia still actively works to rock society in Ukraine?

It is a continuous process. They carry out a complex of measures: clashes occur on the frontline, as well as in other directions. We are talking, in particular, about the strengthening of destructive attitudes in society – this is a direct function of enemy special services.

However, the beginning of the war became a catalyst that led to the unification of Ukrainian society, and today the whole world is with us. Putin is achieving the opposite goal, which is on the surface and does not need to be proved.

Today, a Ukrainian is a hero who defends the whole world, and I constantly say this to foreign partners as well. I say, "I'm sorry, Ukraine is a human shield protecting the whole world from this evil, and not just fighting for its territory, so you should support us to protect yourselves."

Russians bring death. And we bring goodness and truth. Protection of Ukraine is our sacred mission. I am not exaggerating.

 

"MEDVEDCHUK GAVE FULL EVIDENCE"

Do you regret that Medvedchuk was exchanged? Maybe he could be useful for something else?

If you saw the eyes of our heroes who returned home, you would not even ask this question. One for 200 – that says it all. These are our heroes who went through hell, these are the best of the best representatives of society who are fighting for our independence.

On the other side is the state traitor Medvedchuk, who gave full evidence and took part in all investigative actions. Our legal framework allows such an exchange.

Moreover, I should tell you that the number was not 200 at the beginning. First it was 100, then 150, and no one believed that this would happen. You know, all this happened after difficult negotiations, and thank God the heroes were able to return home and give their relatives a hug.

Some of the fighters already continue to defend the country. Our employee with the call sign "Buryi", the defender of Azovstal, is currently also recovering. The experience gained by him will be used by other departments and employees. This is exactly the mentoring institute I told you about.

 

Have all the contacts of Medvedchuk and his entourage been checked in order to prevent their further influence on the internal situation in Ukraine?

Sure. We have both [former Ukrainian MP Taras] Kozak and [former Ukrainian MP Andriy] Derkach under suspicion, all of their property was seized, and a complex of counterintelligence covert searches was carried out. Trust me, everything is done in line with the law and requirements of modern counterintelligence approaches.

 

The SBU detained President of Motor Sich Bohuslayev the other day. For how long have you been investigating him? And why did not you detain him earlier?

I cannot speak for the "earlier" as I am responsible only for the time during which I have been heading the Service. The detention of this person is another confirmation that we have seriously intensified the fight against Russian agents and collaborators.

We made public part of the evidence and his phone conversations with the Russians – it is hard to imagine how a person with the title of Hero of Ukraine can deliberately act against the interests of the state, even during a war.

As for why he was detained only now – the collection of a high-quality evidence base also requires some time. We want not just to detain the criminal, but also to make sure that he ends up in prison. By the way, currently, the court has selected a preventive measure for him – detention, so he will not be able to get out on bail.

And all the details – traditionally later.

 

How potentially dangerous can Russian assets be in Ukraine?

They are not only potentially dangerous. It is about the fact that, first of all, they should be used for the benefit of Ukraine. For this, new legal mechanisms and legislative amendments are being introduced.

In addition, we have seized many assets of Medvedchuk, Kozak, and others like them, we are currently implementing the relevant sanctions of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), and a number of legislative amendments are planned.

The position of the President is unambiguous – everything should be used for the benefit of the state and people of Ukraine.

 

Activities of twelve pro-Russian parties have been officially banned in Ukraine. What about former members of these parties? Are they being investigates?

Sure, such work is underway.

 

Can you see any threats of enemy impact through the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate?

Yes, there are threats. It would be wrong to say that it is a threat that the Service cannot influence and timely document. It is clear that this environment is a perfect field for the activities of enemy residents. Therefore, we are effectively investigating this direction.

Recently, a "priest", who is a classmate of Gundyayev [Patriarch Kirill of Moscow] and regularly kept in touch with the FSB, was detained in Vinnytsia region. The materials that confirm this, including messenger chats, were found.

Since the beginning of the war, we opened 23 criminal cases against such characters. There are already 33 suspects – from classic agents collecting in-depth information to banal fire spotters wearing cassocks.

 

"WE WILL COLLECT A FULL EVIDENCE BASE ABOUT THE IRANIAN-MADE DRONES"

The Mriya loss case. Does the investigation currently have evidence that the management of the State Enterprise Antonov cooperated with the enemy? Why did they ignore the warnings?

We study everything, document it, and later the investigation will give answers to all questions.

It is absolutely clear that we are talking about official negligence at the very least, which the investigation will show further. It is a shame, of course, that we are dealing with such an aftermath.

 

In recent weeks, the enemy has been systematically attacking the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine, our energy system. This not only forces each Ukrainian to get used to a new reality but in general poses a serious threat to the energy system of the entire country. How can energy security be ensured?

Relevant units of the AFU take air defense measures as effectively as possible. As for the SBU functions, I should say that we are not lagging behind here as well: just the other day, an employee of a thermal power plant was detained, who was allegedly engaged in repairs. In fact, he transmitted data to the enemy regarding the current coordinates of energy facilities, and then collected the results of the shelling and transmitted them to the occupiers. He is already giving incriminating evidence.

In general, every place where our facilities are located is constantly checked in terms of counter-sabotage and anti-terrorist measures. What does it mean? A specific location is selected, the forces of the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Police, and the National Guard enter it, and during such a step-by-step screening we find those who are potentially ready to work with the enemy. As a rule, there are also those who actually work for it.

In general, counterintelligence support of critical infrastructure facilities, including energy facilities, is currently handled by the SBU's Main Directorate "I".

 

Unfortunately, there were cases when judges released such people, for example, fire spotters, on bail…

Indeed, there was a certain problem. For example, the judge of the first instance in Kyiv released the enemy fire adjuster – the head of one of the lyceums, and she left for Europe. An unfortunate story for Ukrainians and for me personally. On the same day, the employees of the Service visited that judge with searches to find out if there were any additional motives in his decision. By the way, they found evidence of his rather unpatriotic life and fulfillment of duties.

But currently, all representatives of the judicial branch of government have an understanding of the action plan regarding those involved in war crimes. So, I hope that such situations will not be repeated in the future.

 

You mentioned detailed documentation of Russia's crimes. Will the shelling of the energy infrastructure of Ukraine also become a subject of consideration by international courts?

Some episodes, some evidence will be attached to criminal proceedings that will be heard in international courts.

 

The SBU has launched a case on the Iranian-made drones and missiles that attack Kyiv and the entire territory of Ukraine. What prospects can you see for bringing the leadership of Iran and the country's defense complex to justice?

The investigation will process a large number of international assignments from our foreign partners. And, trust me, we will collect all the evidence base regarding the manufacture, transfer, and further use of Iranian-made drones and missiles. We will document everything effectively – society and the international community will see everything, and those guilty will be brought to justice.

 

"OUR PRISONERS WERE TREATED TERRIBLY IN OLENIVKA"

The Parliament of the Netherlands has supported a decision to create a Special Tribunal for Crimes of Aggression. The Hague municipal authorities are already looking for premises for this trial. What is your personal vision of the prospects of setting up this tribunal and its work?

The prospects are absolutely real. We have talked about the quality of evidence. Everything that depends on the Security Service and has relation to its functions is properly documented.

We are collecting a real treasure trove of evidence that will show who is who in the future trial.

Regarding the venue of the trial, this issue is under debate. Eventually, when the final decisions are made, everything will be known.

Today we are obliged to do our best so that our position is based not just on emotions and words, but on real materials of criminal cases. Here, I emphasize once again, the admissibility of evidence is important. We must provide such a quality of materials that there is no reason for so-called inadmissibility.

 

The crimes committed by Russia contain obvious signs of genocide. Is the deportation of Ukrainians, particularly, children, one of the directions on which evidence base can be collected exactly with this qualification?

Yes, you are right. There are signs of committing this type of crime. In the future, when the investigation and the operational unit will obtain the entire list of necessary evidence and we will have the appropriate suspicions, we will return to this issue from a judicial perspective.

 

The investigation into the crimes of holding the sham referenda in the occupied territories. What are the judicial prospects of these cases?

The prospects are absolutely clear and straightforward. After all, we have collected enough evidence that proves all the criminality of the actions to hold these sham referenda. Moreover, 88 suspicions have already been announced to people involved in their organization, however, the work continues. Currently, it is planned to announce a few more suspicions, in total there will be 103 of them.

Here we have Article 110 of the Criminal Code (encroachment on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine) and Article 111-1 (collaboration activities). That is, no one will evade liability – both key organizers and minor performers.

On the day when the sham referendum began, we already had data on the turnout and results which the occupiers planned to make public.

For us, for our citizens, for the whole world and the courts, there is clear evidence that these so-called referenda are just a fiction as well as a banal information operation, an attempt to legitimize the tricolor rag.

 

The evidence collected publicly and privately – are we going to see them in court already?

Yes, this is an investigation secret. But from time to time, we show some of them in the mass media. As a rule, things that do not fit into the materials of criminal proceedings, so as not to expose the investigation to failure.

 

A terror act in Olenivka. What does the investigation currently know about the circumstances of the crime at the moment? Did the occupation forces really use thermobaric weapons?

A pre-trial investigation is currently underway. We have serious evidence, including those obtained secretly. A number of Azov fighters who have returned also give important evidence. I will not go into details, but I should say that according to the latest data, the so-called "bumblebees" [Shmel flamethrowers] were also used there. Time will pass and we will dot the "i's". But it has long been clear to us and to the world community what it was.

In general, our prisoners were treated terribly in Olenivka – it was there that the enemies brutally abused our soldiers, violating all agreements.

 

"ECONOMY IS NOT A PRIORITY, WE DEAL WITH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIRST OF ALL"

From what you say, you have done a lot of work during these months. Do you feel that the attitude towards the SBU has changed and you can now talk about trusting it?

As for having done a lot of work, I would like to explain that 80% of everything we do remains secret and top secret.

The personnel of the SBU have already received more than 200 state awards – "For Courage", "Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky", three "Heroes of Ukraine". Most of our employees' awards are secret decrees of the President. Therefore, we are sorry that we cannot open the cards in many successful operations.

As for trust, there is a term in operational psychology called the suggestion effect: if you are told ten times a day about your friend that he is a scoundrel, then after a week you will almost believe it. The same applies to the Service. We do not talk about our heroic deeds, we are in the shadows. However, there are "fake sprinklers" that regularly pour mud.

Today, we seek all shameful phenomena in the Service itself and localize them. The entire staff feels it, the state leadership knows about it, and, I hope, the people of Ukraine also feel this.

 

So, why are you still an Acting Head?

I am a serviceman. If a decision was made to appoint me as Acting Head, then we will work like that. This fact does not affect the quality of functioning of the SBU.

By the way, I am probably the one who is the least concerned about this – I have never aspired to positions. It is because positions are a temporary phenomenon. I am interested in a good result and our victory. Sometimes people ask me, "Vasyl Vasyliovych, why are you an Acting Head?" Well, we have enemies who use information resources and try to artificially create destructiveness. This phenomenon in counterintelligence is called "distraction to unnecessary objects".

We are working and moving towards victory – it is one hundred percent and this is the main thing.

 

In recent years, much has been said about the reform of the SBU. In your opinion, is it necessary now? How do you see it and when will it be appropriate?

The bill on the SBU is at the stage between the first and second readings in the Verkhovna Rada. We are ready for a constructive dialogue. The main thing is that it improves the defense capability of the country. The war once again showed that Ukraine needs a strong special service.

Indeed, the beginning of the war automatically accelerated the self-reformation of the Service. Today, the SBU follows the vector of strengthening counterintelligence. All operative units were related to counterintelligence by functions and legally even before that, however, now we are strengthening them even more.

For this, it is necessary to amend the law on counterintelligence activities. This is exactly what I find time for, despite the war, and work with security and law enforcement committees. So far, about 80% of points of the bill have been agreed upon, and representatives of the intelligence community are also involved in this work.

We want to create a correct and effective counterintelligence model. Counterintelligence functions within their units will be performed by the National Police and the Main Intelligence Directorate, while the SBU will remain the main entity.

We will come to the point that individual officials of certain institutions and organizations will understand that from time to time it is necessary to look around to identify the enemy element. Because we can neutralize a hundred agents, but there will be a few that will help the enemy in key areas.

 

The key issue in the reform of the SBU was the economy…

Personally, I am a supporter of the idea that the Service should move away from documenting economic crimes as much as possible. This should be done by the Economic Security Bureau, NABU, and the police investigators. However, when a relevant order comes, we have to fulfill it. But we are gradually moving away even from such documentation.

 

Is the transfer of cases from the SBU to the Economic Security Bureau still ongoing and are you generally satisfied with the cooperation with this structure?

The cases were handed over to the Economic Security Bureau a long time ago. At the same time, there are separate proceedings in the investigation of the Bureau, for which our operative units carry out assignments. This is a continuous process of work within the framework of the legislation.

Actually, the economy is not our priority, we are primarily engaged in counterintelligence. However, there are phenomena that require our urgent intervention.

When someone defends Ukraine, and someone in the rear introduces "schemes" – we resolutely bite the hand in line with the norms of law and morality.