Main Economic Indicators of Ukraine and the World
The article presents the key macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine and the world economy as of the end of December 2025. The analysis was prepared on the basis of current data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU), the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, as well as leading national statistical agencies (Eurostat, BEA, NBS, ONS, TurkStat, IBGE). Maksym Urakin, Director of Marketing and Development at Interfax-Ukraine, Candidate of Economic and Historical Sciences, and founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center, presented an overview of current macroeconomic trends.
Macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine
At the end of 2025, Ukraine’s economy entered a phase of restrained, but more stable completion of the year than had been expected in the autumn. According to the updated NBU estimate, real GDP growth in 2025 was lowered to 1.8%, while consumer inflation in December slowed to 8.0% year-on-year. At the same time, it is important that along with overall inflation, underlying price pressure also decreased: core inflation also slowed to 8.0% in December versus 11% in September. This meant that the Ukrainian economy was ending the year not only with formally positive dynamics, but also with signs of some weakening of fundamental inflationary pressure, despite the war, losses of energy infrastructure, labor shortages, and high budgetary needs.
At the end of the year, the domestic economic picture remained uneven. On the one hand, the consumer segment and part of investment activity looked quite resilient: the NBU noted that in the fourth quarter of 2025 retail trade growth accelerated on average to 13.6% year-on-year, while construction activity was supported by housing repairs and the restoration of the logistics, infrastructure, and energy base. In addition, in the second half of the year, wages in the private sector, according to estimates based on banking data, grew by more than 20% year-on-year, which supported consumption. On the other hand, the production sector remained weaker: in the fourth quarter, industrial output decreased on average by 4.8% year-on-year, primarily due to decline in the energy and extractive industries.
According to Maksym Urakin, at the end of 2025 Ukraine was not in a phase of a classic economic upswing, but in a mode of maintaining macro-stability, where positive indicators are achieved through a combination of tight monetary policy, a large budgetary stimulus, and external support. The economy demonstrated the ability to function under constant wartime pressure, but the structure of this growth remained vulnerable: demand was supported by state spending, wages, and international aid, while the production base, export capacity, and energy constraints continued to hold back full-fledged recovery.
“The outcome of 2025 for Ukraine can be called restrainedly positive, but without grounds for self-complacency. Yes, inflation turned out lower than had been expected in the autumn, underlying price pressure also weakened noticeably, reserves became record-high, and the economy did not slide into decline even despite harsh wartime conditions. At the same time, this is not a sign of a full-fledged upswing. In fact, we are seeing a model of an economy that is holding on through a combination of external financing, high budgetary spending, business adaptation, and the resilience of domestic demand. But without a larger-scale inflow of investment into production, energy, logistics, and technological renewal, this growth will remain limited and very sensitive to any new external or wartime shock,” Urakin emphasized.
Monetary conditions at the end of the year remained tight. Throughout December, the NBU key policy rate was still at the level of 15.5%, and the cycle of its reduction began only at the end of January 2026. Such a level of the rate meant that Ukraine was ending 2025 under conditions of rather expensive money, which was necessary to preserve exchange-rate stability, restrain inflation expectations, and maintain interest in hryvnia instruments. It is indicative that in 2025 the rollover rate of domestic government bonds (OVDP) across all currencies amounted to 116%, and through auctions alone the government raised more than UAH 569 billion in equivalent, which made it possible to partially cover domestic budgetary needs without direct emission-driven destabilization.
Geographical breakdown of Ukraine’s foreign trade (exports) in January–December 2025, in millions of US dollars. Source: State Customs Service of Ukraine.
The external sector remained both the main support and the main vulnerability of the economy. In the fourth quarter, the inflow of international aid intensified sharply, and overall in 2025 Ukraine received $52.4 billion in official financing, including $32.7 billion from the EU and $12.0 billion from the United States. It was precisely this that made it possible to bring international reserves to $57.3 billion at the end of the year, which became a historical maximum. However, in parallel with this, the macro-financial imbalance was also growing: the current account deficit for January-November 2025 reached $30.6 billion, while the consolidated budget deficit excluding grants in revenues amounted to UAH 2.209 trillion, or 24.8% of GDP. The NBU also directly indicated that state and state-guaranteed debt would remain at a level above 100% of GDP over the forecast horizon.
“The key conclusion of 2025 for Ukraine is very simple: external aid bought time for the state, but by itself it does not solve the problem of the weak structure of the economy. Record reserves, large official financing, and even a slowdown in inflation do not yet mean that the economy has become self-sufficient. On the contrary, if you look at the current account deficit, the scale of the budget gap, and the debt burden, it is clear that macro-stability is still to a large extent resting on an external resource. That is why 2026 will be critical: if it does not bring growth in investment into production, infrastructure, energy, and export processing, then the current stability will remain only a mode of maintaining the system, rather than a transition to real economic recovery,” Urakin stressed.
Geographical structure of Ukraine's foreign trade (trade surplus) in January–December 2025, in millions of US dollars. Source: State Customs Service of Ukraine.
Global economy
The world economy at the end of December 2025 looked slowed, but not crisis-ridden. According to the IMF’s October forecast, global growth was expected to slow from 3.3% in 2024 to 3.2% in 2025, while the economies of advanced countries were to grow by approximately 1.5–1.6%, whereas developing countries maintained a pace slightly above 4%. Thus, the key feature of the global picture remained not decline, but a slowdown stretched over time amid very different inflationary and monetary dynamics in individual countries.
In the United States, at the end of 2025, the economy retained resilience. According to the BEA’s initial estimate, in the third quarter real GDP grew by 4.3% at an annualized rate. Inflation at the end of 2025 amounted to 2.7% from December to December, while after the December decision the Federal Reserve maintained the target range for the federal funds rate at 3.5–3.75%. This indicated that the American economy had avoided recession, and that the Fed had already moved into a phase of cautious policy easing.
The eurozone ended 2025 in a state of weak, but still positive growth. According to Eurostat’s preliminary estimate, eurozone GDP in the fourth quarter grew by 0.3% quarter-on-quarter, and over the whole of 2025 by 1.5%. December inflation in the eurozone amounted to 2.0%, and on December 18 the ECB left the deposit facility rate at 2.0%. Thus, Europe approached the end of the year already almost at the target inflation level, but without a strong investment or industrial impulse.
For the United Kingdom, the situation remained contradictory. The ONS estimated GDP growth for 2025 at 1.3%, while inflation in December accelerated to 3.4% year-on-year. At the same time, on December 18 the Bank of England reduced the base rate to 3.75%. This meant that the British economy was growing slowly, while inflation had not yet returned to a level fully comfortable for the regulator.
China ended 2025 with a formally strong, but structurally ambiguous result. According to official data, China’s GDP in 2025 grew by 5.0%, while in the fourth quarter the annual rate was 4.5%. At the same time, December inflation was only 0.8% year-on-year, and on average for the whole of 2025 CPI remained at the zero level. This indicated the persistence of weak domestic demand and an almost deflationary environment.
“China at the end of 2025 was showing an interesting, but contradictory picture: a high GDP growth rate was combined with almost zero average annual inflation. This means that the formal scale of economic growth was not accompanied by a sufficiently strong domestic consumer impulse. This is important for the world, because China continues to remain one of the main sources of global demand for raw materials, industrial goods, and logistics,” Maksym Urakin noted.
Among the large developing economies, India retained the strongest dynamics. According to the government’s first advance estimate, real GDP in the 2025/26 financial year was expected to grow by 7.4%, while inflation in December 2025 amounted to only 1.33%. Turkey remained an example of an economy with relatively decent growth, but a difficult inflationary legacy: at the end of 2025 the IMF estimated its growth at approximately 3.5%, while inflation in December amounted to 31.07%. Brazil ended the year in a restrainedly positive way: according to IBGE data, GDP in 2025 grew by 2.3%, while accumulated IPCA inflation over the year amounted to 4.26%.
As Maksym Urakin believes, at the end of December 2025 the global economy gave grounds neither for panic nor for euphoria. The United States retained resilience, the eurozone stabilized, Britain remained sluggish, China maintained its pace but with deflationary signs, India continued to be the main growth driver among the large economies, while Turkey and partly Brazil continued to exist under conditions of elevated inflationary risk. For Ukraine, this meant that the external environment would not become an automatic source of rapid recovery, while the importance of domestic reforms would only grow.
Conclusions
Ukraine’s economy at the end of December 2025 was in a state of managed, but very fragile equilibrium. On the one hand, the country ended the year with positive GDP growth, inflation of 8.0%, record reserves, and without a currency shock. On the other hand, this stability remained critically dependent on international support, while the structural imbalances of the economy had not disappeared anywhere.
“At the same time, the global economy entered 2026 without a deep crisis, but also without a strong new cycle of growth. For Ukraine, this means that the next stage will be determined not only by the volume of external aid, but by whether the state will be able to transform financial stability into investment, production, exports, and modernization. It is precisely this that will show whether 2025 will remain only a year of holding out, or will nevertheless become the beginning of real economic recovery,” Maksym Urakin summed up.
Head of the “Economic Monitoring” project, Candidate of Economic Sciences Maksym Urakin
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