The agreement to build 9 power units in Ukraine is a fairly significant commitment – Westinghouse top manager Joel Eaker
Interview with Joel Eaker, Senior Vice President of APX Projects EMEA at Westinghouse Electric Company, to the Interfax-Ukraine and "Energoreforma" project.
Text – Nina Yavorska
What role does Westinghouse envision for Ukraine in the development of its nuclear fleet in Europe? In other words, how significant is the company’s commitment to Ukraine despite all the current risks?
Ukraine is expected to play a significant role both in Westinghouse’s nuclear development plans and more broadly across Europe and globally. Energoatom and the Ukrainian government signed a memorandum of understanding with the company that envisages the construction of nine potential AP1000 power units. This represents a very significant long-term commitment.
In your opinion, could the deployment of AP1000 reactors in Ukraine become not only an energy project, but also a geopolitical one?
I believe this question would be better addressed to the Ukrainian and U.S. governments, which are in a position to comment on the strategic value of AP1000 projects.
From our side, we remain committed to actively cooperating with Ukraine and helping strengthen its energy independence. We also understand that AP1000 projects will create new high-quality jobs in Ukraine and contribute to the country’s long-term economic development potential.
Let us imagine that the war has ended. How do you see the development of AP1000 projects in Ukraine? What stages, number of units, and implementation timelines do you foresee?
We already have a very strong starting point – a fully completed reactor design in the form of a standardized turnkey project package. In other words, it is a complete documentation package that can be used to build a reactor. It has been fully licensed in four countries and contains more than 90,000 drawings, diagrams, technical specifications, and other materials required for reactor construction.
We have already incorporated approximately half of the lessons learned from projects in the United States and China. This will enable more efficient and faster construction.
At present, we are engaging with Energoatom to understand what still needs to be improved within the company’s supply chain and within Ukraine overall, as well as how this can best be integrated into Westinghouse’s global supply chain.
The project would begin with Unit 5 at the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant, for which we have already helped Energoatom prepare a feasibility study.
So, KhNPP Units 5 and 6 will be the first reactors built by the company in Ukraine?
Yes, that was the decision made by Energoatom and the Ukrainian government.
Six months ago, in an interview with our media, Dan Lipman said that Westinghouse was unlikely to consider completing KhNPP Units 3 and 4, where VVER-1000 reactors had been planned, especially after Bulgaria declined to sell the equipment to Ukraine. Has the company’s position changed over the past six months?
No, nothing has changed regarding our outlook. We remain focused on KhNPP Units 5 and 6.
What would you advise Ukraine to do with KhNPP Units 3 and 4? If the decision were yours to make, what would your approach be?
That is a difficult question. I do not have sufficient expertise regarding that specific technology to make a concrete recommendation. However, Ukraine was able in the past to complete KhNPP Unit 2 independently, so I believe there may still be opportunities this time as well.
Again, the Bulgarian equipment still exists, but it currently appears unlikely that it will be transferred to Ukraine. In any case, potential options can probably be found, although I cannot provide an expert opinion on the matter.
The war in Ukraine is not only Ukraine’s problem. Russia is creating threats for other European countries where you are building reactors. Have you had to reconsider your protection systems in light of military risks?
We work with the governments of all countries where we implement projects. Questions related to national security within individual states are best addressed by their respective governments.
As for the AP1000 reactor itself, it was designed in such a way that it can withstand even very powerful missile attacks or an aircraft impact. Therefore, our cooperation with governments focuses more on physical protection and cybersecurity issues, including in Ukraine.
That said, yes, we are also working with the Polish government to introduce additional security measures, including the protection of energy infrastructure, given the increased drone activity and other threats we have observed.
Has the war in Ukraine forced Westinghouse to revise its plans in Europe or reconsider the number of projects?
I cannot say to what extent Russia’s position has directly influenced this, but there is currently significant interest in Europe both in terms of energy independence and decarbonization.
Could you tell us about the progress of Westinghouse projects in Poland and Bulgaria? What stage are these projects currently at, when are they expected to be launched, and what are the specifics of their implementation?
Yes, certainly. The Polish project in Lubiatowo-Kopalino recently reached a major milestone – an application for a construction license was submitted to the Polish nuclear regulator.
We plan to sign the reactor construction contract with Poland this autumn, and orders for the first equipment are expected to be placed at the same time.
We have already cleared the construction site for the project and also expect to begin construction under the first contract this autumn.
It is also worth noting that the Polish project is effectively the first major AP1000 project in Europe and serves as a flagship initiative. Accordingly, it is where we are implementing the lessons learned from projects in the United States and China.
In addition, Westinghouse is currently working with the Polish side on adapting standards to the metric system, modifying the dimensions and shapes of steel structures to meet European standards, and many other technical adjustments.
The Bulgarian project – the new unit at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant – is also currently at the contracting stage, and in May we plan to submit the specific reactor design for regulatory approval.
At present, the plans involve three reactors for Poland and two for Bulgaria.
By the way, how long have Westinghouse projects in Europe been underway since the company decided to enter the continent?
Our first contracted activities in Europe began in 2022. However, we had been interested in cooperation with European countries much earlier. Initial negotiations with Poland and Bulgaria date back to 2010, and I personally served as the project manager in Poland at that time.
Hopefully projects in Ukraine could move faster since you will already have European experience by then.
By 2028, we expect to have documentation already adapted to the European market.
Which AP1000 features are particularly advantageous for Ukraine considering military risks? Even after the war ends, these risks will likely remain relevant.
One of the key advantages of the AP1000 passive safety system is that the loss of external power supply caused by attacks on infrastructure has only a minimal impact on reactor safety over a fairly long period of time.
In addition, the system minimizes the need for operator intervention in such situations, allowing personnel to focus on maintaining continued operations. Specifically, the reactor can remain in a safe shutdown state without external power – both primary and backup – for up to 72 hours.
We use water and air to remove excess heat from the reactor, and no additional power source is required for this process. After 72 hours, operators can use portable diesel generators to pump water back into the safety systems and continue operation.
So, if I understand correctly, the reactor can effectively operate for 72 hours without external power and without generators? Unlike the situation at Zaporizhzhia NPP, which switches to generators immediately after losing external power?
The reactor stops generating electricity, but it transitions into a self-protection mode – and yes, this can continue for 72 hours without diesel generators.
I would also add that the reactor has a broad load-following range, operating from 15% to 100% capacity.
How will your reactors integrate into Ukraine’s energy system, including alongside VVER reactors? Will any restructuring or modernization of the grid be required?
The integration process is relatively straightforward. The reactors will be able to operate within the requirements and design parameters of Ukraine’s existing power grid.
This is possible largely because of the reactor’s load-following capability that we just discussed. Through this functionality, Energoatom will be able to adjust AP1000 reactor output in line with the current needs of the grid.
No major additional technological requirements for the grid are expected. The grid simply needs to provide the required capacity and some additional infrastructure at the connection points. Overall, these are fairly standard requirements.
The company says the AP1000 has a simplified design with fewer components and modular construction. How much does this reduce construction time, and what significance does it have for Ukraine?
The European reference design that will also be used for Ukraine incorporates lessons learned from projects in the United States and China. These lessons relate specifically to improving manufacturing efficiency and component procurement processes.
This includes optimization of 15 components and simplification of construction processes for another 50.
What do you believe Ukraine could manufacture domestically, and how extensive could localization be for AP1000 projects?
Ukraine has strong capabilities in nuclear energy and mechanical engineering. Therefore, a significant share of components and equipment could be manufactured locally.
Equally important is the fact that a large portion of the jobs required for reactor construction and operation could also be filled by Ukrainians.
I believe it would be realistic to target 50% or more of the services and equipment required for construction to originate from Ukraine.
One more question regarding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Could your company potentially participate in rebuilding the plant after de-occupation?
Decisions regarding the reconstruction of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant after de-occupation should be made by the Ukrainian government and Energoatom. However, Westinghouse is ready to cooperate with them and offer its services.
Our company remains committed to active cooperation with Ukraine, including supporting the restoration and modernization of the country's energy infrastructure after the war.
