Volodymyr Shchelkunov, President of the Ukrainian National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Ukraine)
Blocked ports mean a blocked economy. Why reopening seaports for all types of cargo is a matter of survival for the Ukrainian economy.
Ukraine has been living and working under the conditions of a full-scale war for the fifth year. Businesses manufacture products under fire, exporters compete on global markets despite destroyed infrastructure, and the state maintains its defense capability to a significant extent thanks to foreign currency revenues generated by the real economy. In this fragile balance, there is one link on which almost everything depends — access to global markets through seaports. Today, that link has been severed.
ince July 2026, the enemy has been systematically attacking civilian vessels and port infrastructure. Ukraine’s deep-water ports have effectively been blocked. Around 90% of the country’s maritime traffic is now at risk. This is no longer a logistics problem affecting individual companies or industries. It is an issue of national macroeconomic stability, the resilience of the hryvnia, and the food security of entire regions of the world.
“Seaports are not just infrastructure. They are the main gateway connecting the Ukrainian economy to the world. When they are closed, it is not one industry that stops — the entire mechanism that generates foreign currency, taxes, and jobs for the country begins to shut down.”
Ports Must Be Reopened for All Types of Cargo
It is important to stress one fundamental point from the outset. The reopening of ports must be full and unconditional — for all types of cargo without exception. Not only for grain, not only for selected “priority” categories, but for the entire range of Ukrainian exports: steel, iron ore, food products, machinery, and construction materials.
The temptation to opt for selective reopening — in the form of a “corridor” for a specific product category — is misguided and dangerous. The Ukrainian economy cannot be divided into “important” and “unimportant” cargoes. The steel and mining sectors generate foreign currency and provide freight volumes for the railway. The agricultural sector feeds the world and brings foreign currency into Ukraine. Rescuing one category while leaving the others under blockade is like saving one lung while the other cannot breathe.
First-Half 2026 Figures: Why Every Export Dollar Is Now Strategic
To understand why the port blockade strikes at the most vulnerable point of the economy, it is enough to look at the official foreign trade statistics for the first half of 2026. They are alarming.
According to the State Customs Service, Ukraine’s total trade turnover in the first half of 2026 reached $70.3 billion: imports amounted to $49.3 billion, while exports were only $21 billion. Goods imports exceeded exports by 2.3 times, or by $28.3 billion. In other words, the country imports almost three times more than it exports.
The trend is even more telling. Compared with the first half of 2025, imports increased by 28% from $38.3 billion, while exports rose by only 5% from $20 billion. The gap is not merely large — it is widening rapidly. Today, exports cover only about 40% of imports.
For the economy, this means one simple and harsh reality: every dollar of export revenue has become a strategic resource. Exporters’ foreign currency earnings help support the hryvnia, pay for critical imports, and reduce pressure on the state’s reserves. The enormous trade deficit is currently being covered by international assistance, and any decision that reduces Ukrainian exports automatically increases that deficit and puts additional pressure on the national currency.
And it is precisely at this moment, when exports are already under severe pressure, that the port blockade is shutting down their main channel. This is a direct blow to the state’s ability to balance its economy.
“We import almost three times more than we export. In such conditions, closed ports are not merely lost logistics — they are a disabled source of foreign currency that the economy critically needs.”
There Is No Real Alternative to the Sea — Only Expensive and Temporary Half-Measures
The most dangerous illusion in the current situation is the assumption that everything will be fine because cargoes can simply be “rerouted” through Danube ports or by rail to EU ports. On paper, this may look logical. In practice, it does not work as a full replacement and can only serve as a partial, temporary solution. There are specific and measurable reasons for this.
Danube ports are not deep-water ports. Their throughput capacity is limited. They can absorb only up to an additional 30% of maritime cargoes, and only for exports to nearby markets. Long-distance destinations — China, East Asia, North Africa — are physically inaccessible through the Danube.
EU ports are not deep enough. Large ocean-going vessels require depths of around 19 meters, which Odesa can provide. Neighboring EU ports offer depths of only up to 15 meters. This is not a bureaucratic restriction but a physical one: a large vessel with a deep draft simply cannot enter a shallow port. This is why entire continental markets can be reached only through Ukraine’s deep-water ports.
Western border crossings are already overloaded. Their throughput capacity is limited, while logistics through them are two to three times more expensive. The need to replace Ukrainian railcars with European ones and the much longer logistics route make such transportation economically unviable for entire categories of cargo.
This is where a second, man-made problem emerges. The government’s decision to raise freight rail tariffs by 30% starting in August 2026 came at the worst possible moment, coinciding with the port blockade. Instead of reducing the cost of alternative logistics and supporting exporters, the state made those routes even more expensive. Fully replacing maritime exports with land routes would require government compensation of up to $100 per tonne — a level that makes such substitution simply unrealistic.
“Alternative routes are not a bridge to the other side — they are a narrow and unstable crossing. A few can get through, but not the entire economy. Only the reopening of deep-water ports can restore logistics and access to global markets.”
Steelmaking Is on the Verge of Shutdown, While Global Food Security Is Under Threat
The mining and metals sector — one of the country’s largest export industries — is suffering the most severe impact from the port blockade. Steelmaking is uniquely dependent on logistics at every stage. Every additional dollar in transport costs multiplies across the production chain. This is why the combination of the port blockade and higher railway tariffs has dealt the industry a double blow. Logistics costs for iron ore have doubled, while for pig iron they have increased two to three times. In many cases, additional transport costs now exceed the profit per tonne of product. This means export contracts become loss-making, while plants already operating under constant attacks are pushed to the brink of shutdown.
In recent weeks, we have already seen the enemy strike enterprises in the mining and metals sector. But the shutdown of a steel plant is not only a loss of exports. It means thousands of jobs in single-industry cities, reduced railway freight volumes, and the collapse of entire supplier chains. This is why steel and iron ore cannot be left “outside the brackets” when ports are reopened.
For the agricultural sector, the consequences of the blockade extend far beyond Ukraine. Our country is one of the world’s largest food suppliers. Ukraine accounts for around 6% of global wheat exports, 12% of corn exports, and more than one-third of global sunflower oil trade. When the maritime corridor is blocked, these volumes disappear from the global market — and food prices rise.
Therefore, reopening Ukrainian ports is not only a Ukrainian issue. It is an element of global food security and the stability of EU markets.
The Cost of Inaction: What One Year of Closed Ports Could Mean
To keep the discussion concrete, the cost must be stated directly. If the maritime corridor is not restored, Ukraine risks losing more than 10% of GDP over the course of one year. Pressure on the hryvnia would increase as export revenues could fall by an estimated $17 billion. The state budget could lose around $8.5 billion in tax revenues. More than 30 million tonnes of agricultural products might fail to reach global markets.
This is not a pessimistic scenario for dramatic effect. It is the logical consequence of shutting down the channel through which the majority of Ukrainian exports move. And it is important to recognize a simple relationship: Ukraine is currently financially dependent on support from its partners, and destabilizing the Ukrainian economy increases the burden on Europe rather than reducing it. Open Ukrainian ports are in the interest not only of Kyiv, but also of Brussels and Washington.
“Closed ports do not save money — they destroy it. Every month of blockade means less foreign currency revenue, fewer taxes, fewer jobs, and more pressure on the hryvnia.”
What Needs to Be Done
The situation requires not declarations but specific, coordinated decisions by the Ukrainian government with the support of international partners. The priorities are clear.
The primary and irreplaceable task is to restore safe navigation and reopen Ukraine’s deep-water ports for all types of cargo without exception. Without this step, all other measures will remain half-measures.
At the same time, while the blockade continues, the state should ease rather than increase the burden on alternative logistics. The recent 30% increase in freight rail tariffs works against exporters and against the state itself under current conditions. It should be reversed in order to stimulate, rather than hinder, transportation through western border crossings.
Supporting the transit of Ukrainian goods through EU ports as part of joint initiatives with partners would also be logical. In addition, given that the EU imports a significant share of steel products, work should be carried out toward reallocating EU steel import quotas in favor of Ukraine — at a level no lower than Ukraine’s actual exports to the EU in 2025.
