Igor Popov, Director, United Ukraine think tank
On the eve of Independence Day, it is worth talking not about calls to hold elections to suit the political moment, but about more fundamental matters: what the Ukrainian state will look like after the war ends, what challenges the elites will face, and which solutions have a realistic chance of being implemented.
Even if security guarantees are obtained after a freeze in hostilities, threats from Russia will remain relevant to Ukraine and Europe for many years. The tactical task for our diplomats is to convince Europeans that ending the war in Ukraine does not increase risks for their countries. On the contrary, preserving Ukraine’s military potential becomes the principal security guarantee. In other words, not prolonging a war of attrition, but ending the war and supporting modern, well-armed and sizeable Defence Forces of Ukraine is a deterrent and a tool for influencing Russian plans. Both the roadmap for a peace settlement and the system of mutual security guarantees should be built around this strategic concept.
For Ukrainian readers, such a role for Ukraine and its army evokes associations with the Zaporizhian Host. Western observers compare it with Sparta — a hyper-militarised society whose neighbours feared direct confrontation with its army. Others speak of the Israeli model or the "porcupine strategy" — a state on which an attack must be so costly as to deter a potential aggressor. Western governments see the Defence Forces of Ukraine, among other things, as a guarantor and contributor to their own security. This includes the possibility of deploying Ukrainian units for combat duty in other countries, primarily in a potential Baltic theatre of military operations. The issue of our troops’ participation in such missions has not yet been widely discussed in public debate, but it cannot be avoided, and all factors and risks must be weighed.
We have to understand that it is precisely for such a concept that the West will be able to allocate funds to Ukraine, and for many years this may remain the largest source of resources for the functioning of the state. At the latest in the series of recovery conferences, hundreds of billions of euros are no longer being announced for reconstruction projects. Ukraine’s losses and needs are only growing, yet the financial position of Western countries leaves little chance of major sums being allocated for a new "Marshall Plan", and the term itself is no longer being used. Targeted projects backed by loan guarantees or earmarked assistance from individual countries stand a better chance. This will make it possible to rebuild the most critical facilities, but it is not enough to create a new economy. Private investment will be able to come in only with 100% insurance coverage, and investors will also see security risks, so we still do not see a queue of those willing to invest their money. Frozen Russian assets are the largest reserve for economic projects, but even they cannot cover all needs. Expectations should not be overstated, and it should be borne in mind that up to half of the assets are already pledged against aid packages provided to Ukraine. Therefore, if they are unfrozen, these sums could be used to cover defence tranches. A more urgent task is to freeze payments on Ukraine’s international financial obligations, followed by restructuring and writing off most of the debt. Annual debt servicing is becoming an unbearable burden on the Ukrainian economy, while the exceptional circumstances provide grounds to demand write-offs.
In a state built around the mission of "Zaporizhian Sich 2.0", strengthening the role of military commanders and giving preference to people with military service experience in appointments to public office is logical. Society places the highest trust in veterans and commanders, and the advancement of people from the military environment is already taking place. It is obvious that in the parliament elected after the war, the share of veterans will also be at its highest. We need to take into account both positive and negative examples of the large-scale entry of military personnel into civilian government in order to preserve at least some elements of civilian governance and democratic freedoms. Even after martial law is lifted, however, the country will not return to its pre-war level of democracy and political pluralism for a long time. Security interests and the basic attitudes of the new elites will lead to restrictions remaining in place, first and foremost on freedom of speech and assembly, the scope of opposition activity, and the media.
High-level corruption remains a problem and a challenge. The chosen strategy of building an anti-corruption structure parallel to the existing law-enforcement system and removing it from parliamentary oversight has produced limited results over ten years. Public scandals show that high-level corruption has not disappeared, while the principle of inevitability of punishment has not become the main KPI. In the practice of transitional democracies, elite pacts — informal social compacts on the rules of the game — have proved an effective means of minimising high-level corruption. Alongside formal codes, informal "red lines" are articulated, the violation of which automatically triggers a tough response from the system. So far, the "new oligarchs" have not demonstrated new approaches, as money earned during the war is still being invested in Dubai real estate, while they remain wary of entering the City of London. A requirement to invest earnings in Ukraine could become one element of a new elite pact, alongside sectors placed off-limits to manipulation and a refusal to cooperate with the aggressor. The main thing is that the additional rules should help protect national security and promote the economic well-being of the country and its citizens.
National elites will take different positions vis-à-vis global elites. The model of globalisation of recent decades is in decline: economic sanctions, trade restrictions and national-security policy increasingly outweigh the logic of free trade, while international law is not always capable of restraining the use of force. At the same time, global financial, political and expert networks retain considerable influence over Ukraine. A new balance of interests and spheres of influence is taking shape between global players and the Ukrainian deep state, even as careers, capital and reputations are damaged in the course of this dialogue.
It is possible that by the next elections, new political movements will emerge in Ukraine with positioning different from that of the pre-war parties. One political force may promote global interests and issues of transhumanism, while another may resemble MAGA or Poland’s Law and Justice. Eurosceptics could join the latter and grow in popularity if Ukraine’s EU accession process drags on. At the same time, the emergence or revival of covertly pro-Russian parties is unlikely.
The Russian side continues to reject compromise proposals for ending the war in Ukraine and insists on demands that are deliberately impossible to accept. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has become part of a global redistribution of rules and influence, so without clarity in US-China relations, one cannot expect a "grand bargain" concerning Ukraine alone. Yet the fundamental questions of Ukrainian statehood need to be discussed now, so that the model of post-war Ukraine is shaped in accordance with our own national interests rather than imposed by external circumstances.
