Volodymyr Kreidenko, Ukrainian MP, deputy chairman of the Committee on Transport and Infrastructure, and Chair of the cross-party parliamentary group ‘Dobrobat – Volunteer Construction Battalion’
Every time Ukraine starts discussing the possible resumption of civilian flights, the same questions return to public debate: why are the airports still closed? Why does Israel continue flying under rocket attacks, while Ukraine does not? Why can’t at least a few routes be launched?
These questions are natural. But behind their apparent simplicity lies a very complex reality, one that should be understood not only by aviation professionals, but also by everyone who, for the fourth year now, has been taking trains instead of planes.
Let us start with the main point. A decision to open or close airspace is not made by a single authority and is not implemented through a single order. It is a multi-level chain of decisions involving the national aviation authority, international regulators such as EASA or the U.S. FAA, airlines themselves, and the insurance market.
A common misconception is that the key authority belongs to the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO. In reality, ICAO sets global standards and provides recommendations, but it has no mechanism to independently ban flights over the airspace of a specific state.
Responsibility for such decisions rests primarily with the state that controls its own sky. Technically, this is formalized through operational notices known as NOTAMs, which establish bans or restrictions for specific areas, altitudes and routes.
Even if a state formally opens its skies, that does not mean aircraft will immediately start flying. An international regulator may recommend that airlines avoid a particular route. An airline may independently decide that the risk is too high. The insurance market may also refuse to cover flights in a conflict zone.
Without an insurance policy that includes war-risk coverage, no major carrier will place an aircraft worth hundreds of millions of dollars on a route over territory facing active military threats. That is why legally opening the sky is much easier than restoring real flights.
On 24 February 2022, Ukraine closed its airspace because of a direct threat to civilian aviation. It was a forced and, in practice, the only possible step. Massive missile attacks, strikes on critical infrastructure and drones operating across the full depth of the country made it impossible to create consistently safe corridors for civilian aircraft.
For Europe in the 21st century, this became an unprecedented situation. For the first time in modern continental history, a state of such size was forced to fully close its sky for years, not because of a local incident, but because of full-scale aggression whose threat extends far beyond the front line.
This is where the Israeli argument usually appears. Israel flies, so why can’t Ukraine?
The comparison is understandable, but it ignores the fundamental difference between the two situations. The Israeli model rests on several factors. First, Israel has a unique multi-layered air and missile defense system, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow. Second, it has a compact territory, which makes it possible to concentrate protection around critical facilities. Third, many of the threats Israel faces are often episodic rather than total in nature.
During air alerts, flights may be temporarily suspended, aircraft may be moved into holding areas and then return after the threat level decreases. But even Israel, at such moments, faces situations where major international airlines cancel flights on their own, without waiting for decisions from the Israeli government.
This model cannot simply be transferred to Ukraine. Not because Ukraine lacks the will or ability, but because the geography is different, the scale of the war is different and the nature of the threats is different.
Missile and drone attacks do not have a fixed vector. They cover different regions, sometimes several at the same time. For a civilian aircraft, this is crucial, because it must remain safe not only on the runway, but along the entire route, from takeoff to leaving Ukrainian airspace.
The direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran clearly demonstrated the limits of even the most prepared systems. During a major escalation, the airspace of several countries in the region was fully or partially closed. Dozens of airlines cancelled flights, extended routes and bypassed dangerous areas through third countries, affecting ticket prices and logistics around the world.
This example is important for Ukraine as well, because even powerful air defense does not guarantee that insurers and carriers will automatically recognize the risk as acceptable for commercial flights.
There are also more tragic lessons. Before 2014, the aviation world partly lived under the illusion that a civilian aircraft could be kept outside a conflict if the fighting was local. The deaths of 298 people on board flight MH17 over Donbas destroyed that illusion forever.
The crash of flight PS752 in Iran showed another type of danger, when the heightened combat readiness of air defense systems under conditions of military tension can lead to the mistaken identification of a target.
After these tragedies, the aviation industry’s approach to conflict zones changed fundamentally. Today, it is not enough to prove that an airport is physically operational. It is necessary to prove the safety of the entire route and to be ready to bear responsibility for it.
The experience of Yugoslavia, Iraq and Syria confirms that aviation in a conflict always depends on the intensity of hostilities. During NATO’s operation against Yugoslavia in 1999, the sky became a theater of war, and civilian aviation effectively stopped operating.
Iraq and Syria show that the return of flights after a reduction in the intensity of conflict is partial, gradual and dependent on international trust. Opening an airport by government decision and actually restoring air connectivity are two different things.
The Syrian example is particularly telling. An airport may formally remain operational, but if international carriers do not fly there and insurance companies do not issue policies, it does not truly return to full-scale operation.
So, can Ukraine open its sky before the war ends? Theoretically, yes. But only if several conditions are met at the same time.
The first is multi-layered protection of a specific airport and the entire flight route, not only the runway, but also the airspace during takeoff, climb and approach.
Special air corridors are also needed, designed to minimize the time an aircraft spends in a zone of potential threat.
International coordination is no less important, since Ukraine will not be able to restore air connectivity without aligning positions with EASA, neighboring states, air navigation services and airlines.
Without the willingness of the insurance market to cover flights over Ukraine, there will be no regular international air service. And even if the state opens a route, airlines will still make their own decisions, which may not coincide with the official position of public authorities.
Ukraine has formally taken an organizational step in this direction. The Ministry for Communities and Territories Development has established a Working Group on preparations for restoring the functioning of Ukrainian airports.
The group includes representatives of the State Emergency Service, the State Agency for Restoration, the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Aviation Service, the heads of key airports, including Boryspil, Kyiv and Lviv, as well as Ukraerorukh.
On paper, such a format should have become a platform for interagency coordination and the preparation of practical decisions. But this is precisely where the main question arises.
If the working group was created to prepare proposals on restoring flights and protecting aviation infrastructure, society should see at least minimal results of its work. This means a clear agenda, regular meetings, published outcomes, developed scenarios or at least communication on what stage the preparation has reached.
Instead, there is effectively no public information about real recommendations, a meeting schedule or adopted decisions. As a result, the working group looks less like a tool for preparing to reopen the skies and more like a formal structure that exists on paper but does not explain to society what has already been done and what is still blocking the practical relaunch of aviation.
Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport is currently one of the clearest examples of preserved operational readiness. The airport remains completely undamaged and technically ready to resume operations.
Out of a pre-war staff of about one thousand employees, around 300 remain today. This is enough to maintain infrastructure, preserve certificates and remain ready for a rapid restart.
The airport’s management has already prepared a step-by-step plan covering the return of part of the personnel, the necessary inspections and training.
According to the airport, three to five airlines have already expressed readiness to launch flights within two to four weeks after the official opening of the airspace and the completion of security procedures.
Lviv may become one of the first platforms for the restoration of Ukrainian civilian aviation. But even here, the key issue is not the speed of the launch, but the proven safety of every specific flight.
At the same time, new aviation infrastructure is also being developed. In Mukachevo, Zakarpattia, a new airport is being built on the site of a former municipal airfield, covering an area of 228 hectares.
The runway will be between 2.7 and 2.8 kilometers long and will be able to receive Class C aircraft, including Boeing 737 and Airbus A320. The project is estimated at around UAH 4 billion, with completion planned for 2027.
Zakarpattia borders several European Union countries, which means this airport has the potential to become part of Ukraine’s transport integration with the EU and to open additional opportunities for business, tourism, humanitarian logistics and international mobility.
However, construction alone does not solve the issue of open skies. It is an infrastructure investment for the future, for the moment when security conditions allow civilian flights to return.
What might the return scenario look like? Most likely, it will be gradual.
First, individual airports with the best security and logistics conditions may reopen. The first flights will likely not be mass-market routes, but special ones, including diplomatic, humanitarian or business flights.
Then major international carriers will gradually return, but only when they see a stable security situation, clear operating rules and acceptable insurance coverage.
Only after that can air connectivity return to a normal commercial model, with competition among carriers, regular routes and growing passenger traffic.
None of these stages can be accelerated by administrative will. Each will become possible only when the market itself sees the conditions for safe operations.
The restoration of flights over Ukraine will send an important signal to the world. It will mean not only an improvement in the security situation, but also the country’s return to full participation in the global system.
Civil aviation is a marker of economic health, international trust and the diplomatic weight of a state. But this is precisely why the decision cannot be rushed.
The trust of passengers, airlines and insurers is built over years and can be destroyed in an instant. A single catastrophe can close the skies over a country more effectively than any formal decision.
Global experience shows that there is no universal approach to civilian aviation during war.
Israel is capable of maintaining airport operations under constant threat, but even it closes its sky and faces mass flight cancellations. Yugoslavia effectively stopped civilian flights during NATO bombing. Iraq and Syria demonstrate that restoring aviation after conflict is a long, partial process dependent on international trust.
Ukraine cannot mechanically copy any of these models. But it can and must use this experience for a balanced, gradual and safe return to the international aviation space.
The creation of an interagency working group alone is not proof of systematic preparation for reopening the sky. Such proof can only come from real results: held meetings, recorded decisions, clear security scenarios and coordination with regulators and the insurance market.
At the same time, preserving the operational readiness of airports such as Lviv and implementing infrastructure projects such as Mukachevo remain important elements of preparation for the moment when the security situation allows civilian aviation to return.
This requires not only political will, but also detailed technical, security, legal and institutional work.
In aviation, there is no such thing as “almost safe.” It is either safe or unsafe.
And until that line is crossed with a proper margin of safety, the pause in flights will remain not only a forced restriction, but also an act of responsibility toward those who are on board the aircraft.
