Six security threats to the Black Sea region

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021-2024)

 

The transformation of the world order, which began with Russia's declaration of its intentions in 2007, and as a consequence, the return of large-scale armed conflicts, primarily on the European continent, has created an unprecedented existential threat not only to the state sovereignty of Ukraine, but also to the survival of Ukrainians as a nation.

On the one hand, the resistance and struggle of the Ukrainian people and modern tools of warfare open a window of opportunity for Ukraine to gain full subjectivity in a new or already established system of international relations. On the other hand, they force us to immediately reconsider the conceptual foundations of national security both for the period of survival and for the future.

This is primarily due to new opportunities that opened up after Russia's failed attempt to seize the territory of Ukraine and the further development of scientific and technological progress.

Rejecting the historical facts that caused the war after Ukraine gained independence, it is the need to ensure own security, including through technical integration, that necessitates a complete transformation of the foundations of national and regional security by rethinking its ideological, political, and economic aspects.

And therefore, I really hope that the next conference on the reconstruction of Ukraine will begin with the announcement of the security format in which all this will take place. Because neither Munich nor Davos did this.

Under such conditions, the search for alliances and long-term unions in regional and global security is a priority task for the state, as a condition not only for survival, but also for long-term peace. Everything else is simply impossible due to the technical and political unpreparedness of the old world, as well as the impossibility of Ukraine's survival in it.

In addition, it is obvious that the war in Ukraine and the Strait of Hormuz has influenced and continues to influence the economic, political, social situation and migration processes not only in Europe and the Persian Gulf region, but also throughout the world. Because the economy, which is derived from the policies of states, is global. All these influences, for all participants in conflicts of this scale – both active and those involved indirectly – are only destructive in nature, with signs of a future deep economic crisis and even the outbreak of an even larger war.

So, today it doesn't matter whether countries that haven't heard the explosions yet understand this perspective. The very events that have been taking place recently force to search for, create, or strengthen the existing format of collective security.

Despite the lack of preventive measures to influence the development of the war in Europe, the very involvement of leading world powers, such as the USA, China, Britain, and leading EU countries, in the process of resolving the crisis does not yield any results.

A situation is gradually being created where, as Henry Kissinger said, “a crisis has arisen from which no one wanted to emerge voluntarily.”

This indicates not only the inadequacy of classical models of collective security, but also the actual destruction of the old world order as a security model and the need to immediately find new effective mechanisms for protection against today's challenges and avoiding world war.

Then the question arises: if the need to create a new security architecture in Europe is obvious and almost predictable, is it obvious for Ukraine to form the same security environment in the Azov-Black Sea region, where in fact the level of threats to us not only remains stable, but also has its own characteristics due to the diversity of at least the coastal states and the presence of their own interests and contradictions?

The Azov-Black Sea region is extremely important for ensuring Ukraine's national security, not only because of maritime access to transnational trade space and resource extraction sites. Due to the war, such a region has already become a separate domain not only for conducting combat operations, but also for protecting both the land zone and the port economic infrastructure.

If we consider this region as geopolitical and shape future security interests in the light of the new world order, then it is even more important for Ukraine – because of the possibility of access to neighboring regions, for example, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa.

All this will be connected with another previously unknown function of state policy at sea, namely the function of projecting power not only in the region, but also beyond its borders.

Of course, thanks to our decisive actions and unprecedented use of new opportunities, Russia was not only unable to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea, but also, due to such circumstances, to lose almost all opportunities for conditional dominance in this region.

The very fact of dominance in the Sea of ​​Azov, as well as the use of the land corridor to Crimea from the territory of the Donetsk region, is only a formal, temporary historical event, because today it practically makes the use of such opportunities impossible and nullifies all of Russia's efforts. All this gives Ukraine a reason to implement its own strategy in this region.

Of course, everything will depend on the development of the war and the formation of prospects for its completion, formed in relevant strategies united by a single political goal.

So, if the political, economic, and military dimensions of the European space are obvious, although currently difficult to achieve, the situation in the Azov-Black Sea region looks more complicated due to a number of challenges and threats and will require complex work on shaping the future of the state in this region.

Just as the need for effective security guarantees, which is the key to sustainable peace, the formation of fair relations in the region regarding the use of marine resources is an unconditional formula for the future existence of Ukraine. The formation of such relations will classically be influenced by both regional and non-regional players, whose interests must be taken into account, especially now when such a window of opportunity is opening.

The Azov-Black Sea region encompasses a variety of littoral states. These are those with a Black Sea coastline, adjacent regions, and various international associations. In addition to Russia, these states include three NATO member states – Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.

Among these NATO member states, Romania and Bulgaria are also member states of the European Union. Turkey, Ukraine and Georgia are not EU members and have different accession prospects.

Presumably, Moldova, another candidate for EU accession, can also be considered as part of the Black Sea region.

Thus, the Black Sea is another zone of confrontation between Russia and the West, where Russia achieved significant successes before the start of the war in Ukraine.

A bright example is the Mediterranean. Over the past decade, Russia's increased involvement in Syria has marked a significant expansion of its presence in the Mediterranean and secured access to that sea. By the time Ukraine limited Russia's power, it was already posing a challenge to European security from both the eastern and southern flanks. At the same time, it is important to understand that it is the Russian Black Sea Fleet that is the logistical and strategic basis for deploying such a capability outside the Black Sea region.

So, what are the strategic interests of alliances and unions and what security threats exist in the Black Sea region today?

 

1. Lack of NATO strategy in the Black Sea region

 

Despite Russia's obvious activity and the actual expansion of NATO at the expense of the littoral states, the Alliance still lacks a strategy for the Black Sea. Although it is clear that the strategic importance of this region for NATO is no longer in doubt.

The main mistake is that by continuing to historically treat the Black Sea as an “inland lake of Russia,” NATO is actually making it possible to expand Russia’s combat capabilities, which have had unprecedented forms since 2000 and, in fact, allowed the creation of centers of instability in the same Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. We know how it ended in Syria. However, the fate of the military bases, including the naval ones, remains unknown.

While NATO promoted a policy of cooperation and dialogue rather than containment and defense in the region, Russia continued to view the alliance as the main threat to its national security. All of this, within the framework of the old world order, frees Russia's hands to expand not only into the North Caucasus, but also into countries such as Ukraine and Moldova.

Ukraine will always remember that Russia will definitely take advantage of any opportunity for imbalance to restore its combat capabilities precisely for expansion – whether economic through blocking roads and logistics, or military.

 

2. The EU strategy is ineffective

 

In May 2025, after a long strategic neglect of the region, the EU presented its Black Sea strategy. Despite the traditionally stated ambitious goals, this strategy in modern conditions, like the White Paper-2030 presented in the same year, remains declarative and ineffective, and therefore only encourages Russia to take more active actions and demonstrate its capabilities.

As in the situation with the Baltic Sea, any determination not backed up by practical steps will not stop Russia. Without the creation of a body with real powers of influence and without a real response mechanism, such initiatives will always be only declarative in nature. Today, the mere issue of protecting critical maritime infrastructure will require not only significant funds but also time. The example of the war in Iran is still available, as is our experience and last night in Romania.

Even the main idea of ​​creating a Black Sea Maritime Security Center remains unimplemented. For example, its location and at least tentative mechanisms through which early warning would lead to timely and reliable action have not been determined.

So, although the European Union has expanded and has the prospect of expanding through countries with access to the Black Sea, and the desire to expand its trade with Africa and the Middle East precisely through the Black Sea, this union has not yet formed a real strategy for protecting and promoting its interests, as well as a vision of European security. All this fully satisfies Russia, which has pursued a policy of preventing the integration of the Azov-Black Sea region into the European and Western space.

The need to reduce the cost of energy resources and the desire to expand one’s own sales markets in the future will, of course, lead to the question: how to restore interaction with Russia after the end of the war in Ukraine? This could lead to new divisions in the Euro-Atlantic community, weakening its long-term strategic coherence, including in this region.

However, the constant sense of threat from Russia still contributes to a broad understanding among all littoral states in favor of NATO and EU membership. Because the very feeling of being left alone against Russia, as in the case of Ukraine, and being outside the regional order in the Black Sea will directly affect the domestic political order in such countries and their geopolitical identity.

 

3. The risk of opening the Bosphorus Strait to Russian warships

 

When talking about non-regional players and their influence on the region, Turkey should certainly be mentioned. It is a historical and geographical guarantor of adherence to a non-littoral policy that involves keeping non-regional actors, including NATO countries, out of the Black and Azov Seas.

It was Turkey's strict adherence to the Montreux Convention and the blockade of warships through the Bosphorus Strait during the war that prevented Russia from strengthening its fleet and limited its offensive and strike capabilities.

With the weakening of Russia's military presence in the region, the most dangerous challenge is the possibility of reopening the strait to the passage of Russian warships. Because it is precisely the ceasefire and the end of the war in the absence of strategies and real mechanisms in NATO and the EU that will give Russia the opportunity to demand that Turkey reopen the strait and, accordingly, restore its military power in the region.

Russia will have the opportunity to regain control over trade flows, which will threaten Ukraine's economic viability. And later – to restore its naval power in the Black Sea and prepare for the next stage of the conflict.

That is why this should be taken into account not only when forming the parameters of a ceasefire and peace agreement, but also in further steps to form rules in the region. Therefore, it is likely that how relations between Turkey and Ukraine, Turkey and the West, and Turkey and Russia develop in the Black Sea will have a decisive impact on the formation of the regional geopolitical order.

 

4. The growth of China's influence

 

Despite the obvious efforts of Russia and Turkey to restrict access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov for non-littoral actors, it is safe to say that the influence of a non-regional player, namely China, is obvious and undeniable. And if this is not a threat, then it is certainly a challenge that all countries in the region must reckon with.

China is gradually and cautiously expanding its presence in the Black Sea region. Traditionally, it is China's economic influence that has been steadily growing and is generally welcomed by the states of the region because of its attractiveness. And such an obvious interest of the Black Sea states in the potential of Chinese economic cooperation could lead to a completely different geopolitical formation in the region, which would ultimately force a reconsideration of the role of all subjects in the region.

It is unlikely that this could cause competition and tension in the region, but it certainly entails the loss of critical infrastructure first, and then fundamental allies and institutions.

It is important for Ukraine not to forget that it is thanks to China that Russia still has the ability to kill Ukrainians and support its own economy while circumventing the sanctions pressure of the same regional subjects.

 

5. Russia's desire to dominate the Black Sea

 

Perhaps the main destabilizing factor in the region remains Russia and its desire to dominate the Black Sea. For Russia, the Black Sea is not just a natural sphere of influence and dominance, it is a strategic platform necessary for its global ambitions, far beyond the region.

Moreover, if the historical and traditional origins of such a desire remain understandable, as do its military actions, then its ability to intervene in the affairs of the Black Sea states is an absolute threat to the formation of a security environment not only in the region. Such intervention relies on the practice of well-established influence on the domestic political, informational, and economic spheres, strategic manipulation of social, ethnic, and economic vulnerabilities, and the cultivation and development of influential local intermediaries whose interests coincide with those of Russia, even if they are clearly not pro-Russian.

The most dangerous thing, as in the case of Ukraine, is that depending on the circumstances, Russia's intervention can be very covert. Whether this is happening right now in one of the countries of the region is incorrect to say. However, it is certain that all of this has happened in Ukraine, with known consequences.

 

6. Wide availability of modern weapons and technology

 

All these processes, which are associated with the acquisition of geopolitical subjectivity and, as a consequence, the acquisition of guaranteed security, must certainly be supported by the capabilities of force and the mechanisms for its implementation.

It is precisely because of this that perhaps the most serious challenge of today is related not only to the rapid development of new weapons and their forms and methods of application, but also to the fact that these modern technologies have become available not only to leading maritime powers, but also to terrorist groups, insurgent formations, or even criminal elements.

When we talk about Ukraine, in the Azov-Black Sea region it not only has an arsenal and experience of application, but is also constantly developing its capabilities. Modern warfare has demonstrated the destructive power of relatively cheap naval and air drones. Their main ability is also to overload and quickly exhaust the air defense and anti-drone defense systems of both large warships and port infrastructure protection systems.

As in the sky, at sea, the cost of a naval drone is hundreds of times less than the cost of an interceptor missile and thousands of times less than the cost of a damaged vessel, which creates the problem of economic exhaustion. Yes, today these systems are in a stage of rapid development, revealing both advantages and disadvantages. However, it is obvious that over time all this will lead to a review of the fundamentals of operations at sea.

In the conditions of compact seas and coastal zones, where historically the bulk of combat clashes at sea occur, even limited use of robotic systems will in the future allow achieving significant efficiency that is on par with or exceeds the capabilities of a classical fleet. Innovative solutions in the field of maritime drones not only compensate for the technical limitations of classic maritime platforms, but also create fundamentally new opportunities for force projection, as confirmed by the experience of the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation in the Black Sea.

So, if the basis of the global economy remains sea routes, which transport about 90% of all goods, and the port infrastructure that provides it, then it is obvious that their security is a direct strategic priority of any maritime state and an indirect interest for the rest of the world.

The obvious conclusion is that security in the Black Sea and the entire Azov-Black Sea region will depend on building a real counterbalance to challenges and threats, the main one of which is preventing Russia from dominating this region.

Given the presence of the Black Sea coast, unique experience in the application of technologies in modern warfare, and Ukraine's desire for democratic transformation, it is impossible to create a reliable counterweight to Russia in the Black Sea without Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine's participation in shaping the future security space in the region is possible only through participation in political and security unification.

Given the fragmentation of the region and the existence of differences in interests, the formation of the future order is extremely important today. All this should encourage NATO not only to invest in the military potential of the littoral states, but also to create new strategies to strengthen its presence in the Black Sea, and especially beyond the borders of this region.

It is precisely the support for Ukraine as a Black Sea country and a powerful naval power, as well as the support for the European regional partnership, that is the basis for ensuring the security of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea and ensuring the security of Europe from the southern direction.