Reform of Ukrzaliznytsia: Real safety or managerial chaos worth millions of hryvnias
Volodymyr Kreidenko, Ukrainian MP, deputy chairman of the Committee on Transport and Infrastructure, and Chair of the cross-party parliamentary group ‘Dobrobat – Volunteer Construction Battalion’
Ukraine truly needs a modern railway safety system. That is not a matter of debate. During the war, the railway has become not merely a mode of transport, but part of the country’s resilience: evacuation, military logistics, exports, humanitarian transportation, and daily connections between cities. Therefore, Ukraine does need safety regulations, technical interoperability with the EU, transparent registries, accountability for rolling stock, and high-quality accident investigations.
These are precisely the goals behind government draft law No. 14174 “On the Safety and Interoperability of Railway Transport of Ukraine,” registered on October 31, 2025. On December 17, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada adopted it in the first reading, and on May 14, 2026, the parliamentary Committee on Transport and Infrastructure supported it for the second reading and final adoption. In other words, the document is no longer merely under discussion — it has effectively moved close to a final parliamentary vote.
However, behind the correct objective lies a very practical question: is it really necessary to create yet another state authority for this purpose?
The draft law provides for the establishment of a separate central executive body that would implement state policy in the railway sector. This authority would be entrusted with licensing, state supervision and control, maintaining rolling stock and infrastructure registries, issuing authorization and safety certificates, overseeing safety management systems, issuing train driver certificates, organizing examinations, authorizing structural subsystems, and preparing annual reports.
In other words, this is not a minor technical adjustment, but the creation of a new center of influence over the entire railway industry.
The problem is that the state already has institutions performing related functions. First and foremost, there is the State Service of Ukraine for Transport Safety (Ukrtransbezpeka). It is already a central executive authority responsible for transport safety, including railway safety. It already has a budget, personnel, organizational structure, experience, procedures, and regional presence.
There is also the National Transportation Safety Investigation Bureau, which already conducts technical investigations of aviation incidents and maritime accidents.
A logical question arises: why not reform these existing institutions, strengthen them, grant them additional powers, and make them more transparent and independent? Why, instead of repairing the current system, is the state once again proposing to build a new one?
This question becomes especially acute when money is involved.
In its official opinion on the draft law, the Ministry of Finance directly stated that beginning in 2027, the operation of the new central railway authority would require UAH 83.6 million annually. Separately, the creation of the necessary functional capabilities for maintaining railway registries would require an additional UAH 100 million during 2027–2028.
This means that during the first two years alone, the state would need to allocate approximately UAH 267 million: annual operational costs plus expenses for registries. And this is only the officially calculated portion. In reality, a new authority also means management staff, administrative offices, salaries, equipment, procurement, business travel, IT support, legal services, accounting, and HR departments.
For comparison: in 2025, Ukrtransbezpeka had budget allocations of approximately UAH 409.6 million; the National Transportation Safety Investigation Bureau was allocated around UAH 36.5 million for 2026; the State Aviation Administration around UAH 172.7 million; and the Shipping Administration approximately UAH 49.2 million according to published budget data.
Thus, the new railway authority, in terms of expected cost, would be more expensive than the existing transport accident investigation authority and nearly twice as expensive as the Shipping Administration’s budget benchmark.
During wartime, such expenditures should not be justified by general statements about reform, but by a clear answer to a simple question: why can these functions not be carried out within already existing institutions?
There is another risk — duplication of functions.
If Ukrtransbezpeka is already responsible for transport safety, while the new authority would be responsible specifically for railway safety, who would ultimately be in charge? Who would conduct inspections? Who would issue orders? Who would maintain registries? Who would bear responsibility for mistakes?
When responsibility is divided among several institutions, it often simply dissolves.
For businesses, this means new approvals, new offices, new paperwork, and new fees. For the state, it means additional spending. For citizens, it provides no guarantee whatsoever that trains will become safer merely because another institution has been created.
An equally important issue is staffing.
Ukraine has a limited number of railway safety specialists. A new authority will not create such professionals automatically. Instead, it will simply begin drawing personnel away from Ukrzaliznytsia, Ukrtransbezpeka, training centers, or the private sector.
As a result, the system may not become stronger — it may merely spread the same specialists across multiple state structures.
Add to this a transitional period in which old institutions continue operating, new ones are still being formed, registries are not yet ready, and secondary legislation is still being drafted, and the result could be managerial chaos precisely in a field where chaos is dangerous.
At the same time, the European rules cited by the authors of the reform do not require the mechanical creation of a completely new institution from scratch. They require independence, competence, transparent procedures, and sufficient resources.
These objectives can be achieved in different ways.
One option would be to reform Ukrtransbezpeka by establishing a strong dedicated railway division within it, introducing guarantees of independence, implementing transparent procedures for appointing leadership, digitizing registries, eliminating duplication, and ensuring public reporting.
For accident investigations, the National Transportation Safety Investigation Bureau could be strengthened and given a railway division as well.
Such an approach would be more logical, less expensive, and easier for the public to understand.
That is why draft law No. 14174 should be revised before the final parliamentary vote. This can still be done within the parliamentary Committee on Transport and Infrastructure.
The Committee has the opportunity to change the logic of the document: instead of automatically creating a new authority, it could provide for the transfer or expansion of powers within an existing institution.
Such an approach would make it possible to fulfill European requirements without unnecessarily expanding the state apparatus and without imposing additional burdens on the budget.
The main goal of the reform should be simple: not a new sign on the door, but a safer railway system.
People do not care what the authority is called. They care that trains are safe, rules are fair, oversight is professional, and public funds are spent wisely.
If the state already has institutions that can be reformed and granted additional powers, then creating yet another structure should be the last solution, not the first.
The draft law is necessary, but in its current form — particularly regarding the creation of a new authority — it should be revised. Instead of building another bureaucratic superstructure, the state should finally make the existing system work properly.