Five developments in the global gas market to watch until the end of 2026
Oleksandr Gorbunenko, Partner at “Agro Gas Trading”
By 2026, the global gas market had finally emerged from a phase of relative stability and transformed into a highly turbulent environment, where the price of the resource is determined not only by the balance of supply and demand, but also by military conflicts, logistical risks, and the political decisions of key players. In essence, this marks the emergence of a new energy reality in which infrastructure becomes a target and security becomes a key market variable. Against this backdrop, it is worth highlighting a series of events and processes that could significantly reshape the market by the end of the year.
“Leviathan” and the Great War in the Middle East
In 2026, the “Leviathan” gas field became one of the key indicators of instability in the global gas market.
During the escalation of the conflict between Israel and the U.S. against Iran, production at the field was halted for 33 days for security reasons. This decision had an immediate effect – gas supplies to Egypt, which imports Israeli gas for domestic consumption, were disrupted. In response, Cairo was forced to rapidly increase imports of liquefied natural gas and impose restrictions on energy consumption.
After resuming operations, “Leviathan” is once again supplying gas to both Israel’s domestic market and for export, but the situation remains extremely vulnerable. The field, like other infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean, is within range of Iranian missiles and drones, and is also a potential target for Lebanon’s “Hezbollah” and Yemen’s Houthis.
An additional risk factor is the overall deterioration of security in global maritime space and related infrastructure – attacks on ships and ports, as well as the use of drones, may become a common occurrence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The rapid deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey, as well as the “new-old” tensions between Turkey and Greece and Cyprus, are exacerbating regional turbulence.
In the event of a new escalation, even a short-term decommissioning of the “Leviathan” could trigger a chain reaction – ranging from a gas shortage in the region to rising LNG prices globally.
How Qatar’s Role in the Global Market Will Change
In 2026, Qatar found itself in a situation that could define its position in the global LNG market for years to come. Following Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure, the country was forced to partially halt production of LNG and related products, creating a market shortage and driving prices up amid an emotional market reaction.
Despite initial estimates of a prolonged decline in production, the recovery is proceeding faster than expected – some of the liquefaction lines in the Ras Laffan industrial cluster have already resumed operations, and Qatar is gradually restoring its export capacity. However, this process remains uneven and depends not only on technical factors.
The security situation, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, remains a key constraint. Even with the resumption of production, risks to shipping – ranging from potential restrictions on the passage of gas carriers to attacks on infrastructure – create constant uncertainty for buyers.
This, in turn, gives rise to a second key factor: a shift in consumer behavior. Europe and Asia, which have traditionally relied on Qatari LNG as a reliable source, may begin to diversify their purchases, reducing their dependence on a region with heightened risks.
Against this backdrop, other players are stepping up their efforts – primarily the United States, as well as Russia, Australia, and Malaysia – who will seek to capture the market share that is temporarily or structurally becoming available. Given that the United States surpassed Qatar in LNG export volumes after 2023, competition will only intensify.
Ultimately, Qatar’s role will be determined not so much by the volume of its resources or production capacity as by its ability to guarantee the stability of supply. If security risks persist, even a partial resumption of production will not guarantee a return to previous market positions.
Will the EU Break the Record for Russian LNG Imports?
In 2026, the European Union found itself in a paradoxical situation: despite the EU’s already approved phased phase-out of Russian gas, which is to be implemented by the end of 2027, imports of Russian LNG are rising again – and may reach new highs.
The key factor has been the escalation in the Middle East. Disruptions in supplies from Qatar and risks to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have forced European buyers to seek quick alternatives. As a result, the “Yamal LNG” project has significantly increased its market presence. In the first quarter of 2026, shipments to the EU rose by 17% and reached approximately 5 million tons.
This continues a trend that emerged after 2022: the decline in pipeline supplies from Russia was accompanied by a rise in LNG imports, which for a long time were not subject to strict restrictions. In 2024, the EU already set a record by importing 15.5 million tons of Russian liquefied natural gas.
Against this backdrop, a likely “pre-purchase” scenario emerges – where individual EU countries may deliberately increase LNG imports from Russia in 2026, especially toward the end of this year, ahead of the expected phase-out starting in 2027. At the same time, the European Commission has not publicly signaled a willingness to reconsider its commitments.
As a result, Europe is caught between two imperatives: the need to ensure energy stability right now and the political decision to phase out Russian gas in the near future. It is precisely this contradiction that will shape market dynamics in the near term.
The TAPI Pipeline: Between War and a Chance for Stabilization
The TAPI (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) gas pipeline project, first discussed back in the 1990s, remains one of the most controversial infrastructure projects in Eurasia – both a potential hub for economic integration and a source of political risks.
In 2026, signs of cautious progress emerged – construction of the first phase of the gas pipeline is underway in Afghanistan. According to statements from the Turkmen side, completion of the section to Herat Province (northwestern Afghanistan) is expected by the end of 2026. Turkmenistan is also signaling its readiness to expand the project’s scope by opening it up to participation by American companies. This could mean not only potential investments but also greater political interest in the project’s stability, and thus more substantial security guarantees.
Further intrigue is created by the possibility of Kazakhstan joining the project with a stake of up to 30%, which would transform TAPI into a broader Eurasian project rather than a regional one.
However, fundamental risks remain. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have deteriorated again, including local hostilities, which cast doubt on the security of the future infrastructure. Without political and security stabilization in this region, the full implementation of TAPI seems unlikely.
At the same time, the project itself could serve as a catalyst for such stabilization. The economic benefits – transit revenues, energy security, and access to new markets – have the potential to compel the parties to seek a compromise. This is especially true if external players interested in reducing regional risks and opening new export routes join the process, including the United States, which is already engaged in dialogue with Pakistan as a mediator in resolving the conflict in Iran.
In this sense, TAPI is not just a gas pipeline, but a test of the possibility of transforming a conflict-ridden region through economic interests.
The Energy Transition: Between Hydrogen and Natural Gas
In 2026, it is becoming increasingly clear that what people preferred not to voice aloud just a few years ago is now evident: the development of the hydrogen economy is proceeding much more slowly than expected. As a result, the global gas market is getting a sort of “reprieve” from the scenarios of rapid natural gas displacement that were actively discussed at the beginning of the decade. Just three or four years ago, “green” hydrogen was seen as a potential driver of rapid transformation in energy, industry, and even, to some extent, heat supply.
The reality has turned out to be much more complex. The cost of producing “green” hydrogen in most regions remains significantly higher than the cost of natural gas, even accounting for periods of high energy prices. Infrastructure poses an additional barrier – transporting hydrogen requires either the creation of new specialized networks or the costly retrofitting of existing gas pipelines, which increases the overall cost of the supply chain. Storage and scaling also remain technologically complex and economically sensitive issues, especially for the mass market.
The experience of the energy crisis of the 2020s has made governments and companies more cautious – during periods of high volatility, the priority shifts toward proven energy sources capable of guaranteeing stable supplies. In this context, some hydrogen projects around the world have indeed been revised – with delays, reduced scales, or changes in configuration. At the same time, other projects continue to develop, particularly in the industrial hydrogen and “clean” technologies segments for heavy industry.
Against this backdrop, companies in Europe and Asia, in parallel with decarbonization strategies, continue to enter into long-term contracts for natural gas supplies, viewing it as a transitional and systemically important resource during the energy transition.
As a result, natural gas is likely to retain a key role in the global energy mix at least in the medium term, while hydrogen is moving toward gradual specialization – primarily in heavy industry, the chemical sector, and specific transportation niches. In this sense, the “energy transition” is not disappearing, but is becoming a significantly slower and more uneven process than previously anticipated.