Technical inspection for all cars: why laws alone are not enough and why a launch during the war will be a mistake
Volodymyr Kreidenko, Ukrainian MP, deputy chairman of the Committee on Transport and Infrastructure, and Chair of the cross-party parliamentary group ‘Dobrobat – Volunteer Construction Battalion’
Following statements by Deputy Minister for Communities and Territories Development Serhiy Derkach on the need to return mandatory technical inspections for all cars, the discussion has again entered the public sphere. The argument sounds familiar: Ukraine has obligations to the European Union, and therefore, by the end of 2027, relevant decisions must be made. At the level of a general declaration, this may look convincing, but in reality, such a framing of the issue is too simplified. And in current conditions, it is even dangerous.
First of all, it is necessary to stop mixing different stages of the same reform; one issue is the preparation of legislative changes. An entirely different matter is the real, full-scale introduction of mandatory technical control for all passenger cars. It is on this substitution that a significant part of the public rhetoric of the executive branch responsible for transport policy is built today. The society is effectively offered to perceive this as an almost linear process: there are obligations to the EU, so changes must be adopted by 2027, and then the technical inspection returns, but in real public administration, it doesn't work that way.
The law itself does not launch anything; it only creates a framework. For the technical inspection to really work not on paper, but in life, one vote in the Verkhovna Rada is not enough. A large package of regulatory legal documents and bylaws is needed to determine who conducts the control, under what procedure, on what equipment, according to what standards, how results are recorded, how a single database is formed, who performs the audit, how operator admission works, and what responsibility arises for interference in the procedure. Without this, any statements about the "return of technical inspection" are either premature or purely political.
And this is where the main question arises for the executive branch responsible for transport: is it ready not just to voice intentions, but to build the entire administrative, technical, and regulatory architecture of the reform? So far, such readiness is not visible; moreover, the very tone of individual government statements indicates a dangerous desire to reduce a complex reform to a few public theses about "European integration obligations". Technical inspection is a complex mechanism that either works honestly and automatically or turns into an old corruption scheme.
Another fundamental point that the executive branch in the transport sector must speak frankly about: by 2027, legislative changes can be prepared and adopted, as well as the necessary regulatory legal documents developed. However, it does not follow from this that the mandatory technical inspection itself should be launched during the war or automatically immediately after the adoption of the relevant law. On the contrary, a full return of technical inspections for all passenger cars is possible only after the end of the war. This is not an attempt to block the reform, but an attempt to return common sense to it.
Ukraine in 2026 lives in conditions of exhaustion, economy, unequal access to services, damaged infrastructure, and very high dependence of citizens on their own transport. For millions of people today, a car is not a matter of prestige, but a way to get to work, take a child or parents, bring help, and ensure mobility where public transport does not work properly. Therefore, the executive branch leading the transport direction must first give an answer not to Brussels, but to the Ukrainian society: what exactly will change this time? How will the human factor be removed, and how will the old intermediary market be destroyed? How will the driver be protected from another contact with a humiliating procedure?
As long as there are no such answers, any statements about the return of technical inspection will be perceived as an attempt to impose a new obligation without providing new quality. Under such conditions, only one reasonable position is possible: legislative changes can be adopted by the end of 2027. In parallel, all necessary regulatory legal acts, technical regulations, procedures, requirements for equipment, electronic registers, certification of operators, and control over them must be prepared. But the actual introduction of technical inspection for all passenger cars should take place after the end of the war.
And here another fundamental topic arises, which in Ukraine has been avoided for too long. For the full implementation of technical inspection, a full-fledged Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure is needed. Not a hybrid construction with blurred powers or a residual administrative format, but a strong central executive body that professionally forms and implements transport policy. Such a reform is not launched by individual comments from a deputy minister; it requires an institution capable of managing the entire process: from policy development to technical standardization, from launching electronic systems to monitoring the implementation of rules on the ground. Without a full-fledged specialized ministry, technical inspection risks remaining either a fragmentary initiative or another imitation where the law is adopted, but there is no working mechanism.
In other words, the problem is not only whether there is political will to return the technical inspection. The problem is whether there is sufficient institutional capacity in the executive branch system responsible for transport to do this without chaos, manual intervention, and corruption. Today there is no such confidence, and therefore loud statements about deadlines sound more like political anticipation of real readiness.
A separate story is what the format of passing technical control should be; there can be no compromises here. Only a fully automated model is acceptable for Ukraine. Any "partial" format, semi-manual procedure, or space for interpretations will immediately restore what the country has already tried to move away from once. The procedure must be simple: a car enters a certified line, the equipment automatically reads parameters, results automatically enter a single electronic system, and the conclusion is formed based on data, not on sympathies, calls, or "agreements". Only such a model can give people the feeling that it is about safety, and not about another mandatory service with a corruption component.
It is no less important to establish rational exceptions. Cars covered by the current manufacturer's warranty should not undergo mandatory technical inspection. New cars or cars under warranty are already under regular service supervision. The owner is forced to comply with the maintenance schedule, otherwise, they lose warranty protection, so there is simply no point in duplicating this control with another state procedure. The main focus should be directed where risks are really higher: old cars, used imports, and cars after serious accidents. It is in this segment that technical control can be a safety tool, rather than a bureaucratic ritual.
Full introduction of mandatory technical inspection for all passenger cars is possible only after the end of the war, in the presence of a full-fledged Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, a full package of sub-legislative regulation, and exclusively in an automated format. Everything else is either haste or an imitation of readiness.
